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#### **Immigration reform will pass, but capital’s key**

Star-Telegram 2/2 [“Finally, a bipartisan approach to immigration policy”, http://www.star-telegram.com/2013/02/02/4595720/finally-a-bipartisan-approach.html]

With leadership from the president, both political parties and both houses of Congress, comprehensive immigration reform -- one of the most divisive issues in the nation for a generation -- appears to be on a fast track for approval. Of course, that doesn't mean that grand plans offered back-to-back by a bipartisan group of senators and President Obama won't be sidetracked, as anything can happen in a politically polarized nation and on such a volatile subject. But the fact that Republicans and Democrats are in agreement that something has to be done, and that the two newly unveiled plans for immigration overall have similar objectives, it would be regrettable if Congress botched this opportunity.

#### Plan costs pc

AEA 8/17/12 (American Energy Alliance, “In the Pipeline: 8/17/12,” http://www.americanenergyalliance.org/2012/08/in-the-pipeline-81712/)

 Basically, Dan Simmons ran the show, even though it’s not actually named after him. The Diane Rehm Show (8/16/12) reports: “The role of subsidies for wind energy has become a **hot-button issue** in the presidential campaign. Governor Romney opposes extending tax credits for the wind industry. President Obama has re-doubled his commitment to them. In a rare show of bipartisanship last week, the Senate Finance Committee voted to extend the credits for another year. The debate over their fate will likely surface again in the fall. Supporters of the extension argue all major sources of energy have received federal help. Opponents say it’s time to let the free market take over. Diane her guests discuss the politics the future of wind energy in the U.S.”

**Reform expands skilled labor – spurs relations and growth in China and India**

Los Angeles Times, 11/9/20**12** (Other countries eagerly await U.S. immigration reform, p. http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/world\_now/2012/11/us-immigration-reform-eagerly-awaited-by-source-countries.html)

"Comprehensive immigration reform will see **expansion of skilled labor visas**," predicted B. Lindsay Lowell, director of policy studies for the Institute for the Study of International Migration at Georgetown University. A former research chief for the congressionally appointed Commission on Immigration Reform, Lowell said he expects to see at least a **fivefold increase** in the number of highly skilled labor visas that would provide "a **significant shot in the arm for India and China**." There is **widespread consensus among economists and academics** that skilled migration **fosters new trade and business relationships** between countries and **enhances links to the global economy**, Lowell said. "Countries like India and China weigh the opportunities of business abroad from their expats with the possibility of brain drain, and I think they still see the immigration opportunity as a bigger plus than not," he said.

**U.S.-India relations key to avert South Asian war**

**Schaffer 2** (Teresita – Director of the South Asia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Security, Washington Quarterly, p. Lexis)

Washington's increased interest in India since the late 1990s reflects India's economic expansion and position as Asia's newest rising power. New Delhi, for its part, is adjusting to the end of the Cold War. As a result, both giant democracies see that they can **benefit by closer cooperation**. For Washington, the advantages include a wider network of friends in Asia at a time when the region is changing rapidly, as well as a **stronger position** from which to help **calm possible future nuclear tensions in the region**. Enhanced trade and investment benefit both countries and are a **prerequisite for improved U.S. relations with India**. For India, the country's ambition to assume a stronger leadership role in the world and to maintain an economy that lifts its people out of poverty depends critically on good relations with the United States.

#### Extinction

Hundley 12 (Tom Hundley is senior editor at the [Pulitzer Center on Crisis Reporting](http://pulitzercenter.org/). This article for Foreign Policy is part of the Pulitzer Center's [Gateway project](http://pulitzercenter.org/going-nuclear) on nuclear security. [Race to the End](http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/09/05/race_to_the_end) http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/09/05/race\_to\_the\_end?page=0,3)

The arms race could make a loose nuke more likely. After all, Pakistan's assurances that its nuclear arsenal is safe and secure rest heavily on the argument that its warheads and their delivery systems have been uncoupled and stored separately in heavily guarded facilities. It would be very difficult for a group of mutinous officers to assemble the necessary protocols for a launch and well nigh impossible for a band of terrorists to do so. But that calculus changes with the deployment of mobile battlefield weapons. The weapons themselves, no longer stored in heavily guarded bunkers, would be far more exposed. Nevertheless, military analysts from both countries still say that a nuclear exchange triggered by miscalculation, miscommunication, or panic is far more likely than terrorists stealing a weapon -- and, significantly, that the odds of such an exchange increase with the deployment of battlefield nukes. As these ready-to-use weapons are maneuvered closer to enemy lines, the chain of command and control would be stretched and more authority necessarily delegated to field officers. And, if they have weapons designed to repel a conventional attack, there is obviously a reasonable chance they will use them for that purpose. "It lowers the threshold," said Hoodbhoy. "The idea that tactical nukes could be used against Indian tanks on Pakistan's territory creates the kind of atmosphere that greatly shortens the distance to apocalypse." Both sides speak of the possibility of a limited nuclear war. But even those who speak in these terms seem to understand that this is fantasy -- that once started, a nuclear exchange would be almost impossible to limit or contain. "The only move that you have control over is your first move; you have no control over the nth move in a nuclear exchange," said Carnegie's Tellis. The first launch would create hysteria; communication lines would break down, and events would rapidly cascade out of control. Some of the world's most densely populated cities could find themselves under nuclear attack, and an estimated 20 million people could die almost immediately. What's more, the resulting firestorms would put 5 million to 7 million metric tons of smoke into the upper atmosphere, according to a [new model](http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=local-nuclear-war) developed by climate scientists at Rutgers University and the University of Colorado. Within weeks, skies around the world would be permanently overcast, and the condition vividly described by Carl Sagan as "nuclear winter" would be upon us. The darkness would likely last about a decade. The Earth's temperature would drop, agriculture around the globe would collapse, and a billion or more humans who already live on the margins of subsistence could starve. This is the real nuclear threat that is festering in South Asia. It is a threat to all countries, including the United States, not just India and Pakistan. Both sides acknowledge it, but neither seems able to slow their dangerous race to annihilation.

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**Text: The fifty United States and relevant territories should provide substantial financial incentives for wind energy development in Central Appalachia. They should not recruit large corporations but should direct incentives to Appalachia residents and business owners.**

**CP solves**

Goldstein ’11 [Blair S., B.A., Georgetown University, “WIND ENERGY DEVELOPMENT IN THE UNITED STATES: CAN STATE-LEVEL POLICIES PROMOTE EFFICIENT DEVELOPMENT OF WIND ENERGY CAPACITY?” April 14, <https://repository.library.georgetown.edu/bitstream/handle/10822/553738/goldsteinBlair.pdf?sequence=1>]

**In the absence of a strong federal renewable energy policy, states have enacted state-bystate policies to promote renewable energy development. These policies have contributed to a surge in wind energy. U.S. wind capacity has increased from about 2,500 MW in 1999 to about 25,000 MW in 2008**. 4 **Popular state-level renewable energy policies include: mandatory green power options, public benefit funds, loans, tax incentives, and grants. One of the most common state-level policies is the RPS**. **As of 2008, 27 states and the District of Columbia had passed a mandatory RPS**. 5 **Another, five states had passed a voluntary RPS**. 6 There is no standard RPS model. Instead, policies vary substantially. States require differing amounts of renewable energy generation, set different timelines for compliance, and allow different energy sources to contribute toward the renewable goal.

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#### **The United States Supreme Court should** **rule that the lack of a set-aside for Central Appalachia in the Rural Energy for America Program to increase financial incentives for energy production of wind power is unconstitutional.**

#### **Courts defer to preemption and the executive branch now – new ruling is key to environmental federalism**

Engel 6 – Professor of Law, University of Arizona James E. Rogers College of Law (Kirsten H. “FILLING THE GAPS? ARTICLE: HARNESSING THE BENEFITS OF DYNAMIC FEDERALISM IN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW,” 56 Emory L.J. 159)

The disconnect between the actual practice of environmental federalism and theories advocating a nonoverlapping allocation of environmental regulatory authority between the states and the federal government should give federalism scholars pause. Those seeking a more rigid separation of state and federal power are going against the grain of the political dynamics at work in our federal structure. n75 The task of fitting the unruly nature of the actual allocation of authority to that advocated in theory would require the courts to assume a far more active federalism-policing role. For example, to discourage federal regulation of primarily state and local environmental issues for which the justification for federal involvement is weak, the courts would have to assume a narrower interpretation of Congress's powers under the Commerce Clause, the enumerated power under which most environmental laws are enacted. Similarly, to discourage state and local regulation of environmental problems having national and international externalities, the courts would have to adopt a more aggressive approach to the dormant Commerce Clause and the Supremacy Clause, both of which empower the courts to strike down state and local environmental regulation. Doubts regarding the courts' ability to police the contours of federalism under these doctrines led in part to Henry Wechsler's famous suggestion that the political process itself contained sufficient safeguards for the continued viability of the states and the "process federalism" movement. n76 Even those that bemoan the current mismatch between the allocation of state and federal authority in environmental law recognize that the courts are unlikely to force wholesale revisions in existing environmental regulation, nor is there much interest on behalf of the legislative and executive branches for "revisiting the basic structure of federal environmental law." n77

#### **Key to grid decentralization, solves attacks**

Ferrey 4 – Professor of Law, Suffolk University Law School (SUSTAINABLE ENERGY, ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY, AND STATES' RIGHTS: DISCERNING THE ENERGY FUTURE THROUGH THE EYE OF THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE, 12 N.Y.U. Envtl. L.J. 507, Lexis)

We are embarked on a significant and ultimately inevitable transition from fossil fuels to renewable energy resources, by far the fastest growing source of new electric power in the U.S. n5 The leverage for these renewable power resources is fulcrumed at the [\*508] state level by a host of renewable electric power subsidies and requirements. n6 Eighteen states, including every large state except Florida, are deregulating their electric power sectors. n7 The so-called "renewable resource portfolio standard" is adopted in most of these deregulated states, as is the renewable energy system benefit charge trust fund subsidy. n8 These state policies drive American energy policy into the twenty-first century. This energy transition has profound effects on the decentralization of power in America. It diversifies and strengthens the U.S. energy system against attack and failure in the post-September 11 era. But despite the beneficial environmental and national defense implications of this state-subsidized push into a renewable power future, n9 there are serious Constitutional tripwires lurking before some of these innovative state initiatives. This Article critically analyzes application and violations of the dormant Commerce Clause and the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution posed by these state renewable energy programs. n10 In twenty-first century America, power is the quintessential good (or service) in interstate commerce. Yet, some of the states through these initiatives use interstate power sales to subsidize in-state enterprises, while beggaring their neighbors. The U.S. Supreme Court has struck down similar programs involving interstate goods taxed by states to provide local subsidies. n11 This Article attempts to determine which of the key renewable energy initiatives commit constitutional violations and are thus not legally sustainable. Given the pivotal role of power in the American economy, this Article charts and outlines how states can accomplish a range of renewable energy promotions without running afoul of Constitutional and other legal limitations. It also suggests federal solutions. While the many varied state programs create wonderful laboratories for experimentation, only by fostering the renewable energy future without constitutional violations can the energy future be founded on a truly sustainable base.

#### Nuclear war

Habiger 10 (Eugue – Retired Air Force General, Cyberwarfare and Cyberterrorism, The Cyber Security Institute, p. 13-15)

There is **strong evidence** to suggest that al Qaeda has the ability to conduct cyberterror attacks against the United States and its allies. Al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations are extremely active in cyberspace, using these technologies to communicate among themselves and others, carry out logistics, recruit members, and wage information warfare. For example, al Qaeda leaders used email to communicate with the 9‐11 terrorists and the 9‐11 terrorists used the Internet to make travel plans and book flights. Osama bin Laden and other al Qaeda members routinely post videos and other messages to online sites to communicate. Moreover, there is evidence of efforts that al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations are **actively developing cyberterrorism capabilities** and seeking to carry out cyberterrorist attacks. For example, the Washington Post has reported that “U.S. investigators have found evidence in the logs that mark a browser's path through the Internet that al Qaeda operators spent time on sites that offer software and programming instructions for the digital switches that run power, water, transport and communications grids. In some interrogations . . . al Qaeda prisoners have described intentions, in general terms, to use those tools.”25 Similarly, a 2002 CIA report on the cyberterror threat to a member of the Senate stated that al Qaeda and Hezbollah have become "more adept at using the internet and computer technologies.”26 The FBI has issued bulletins stating that, “U. S. law enforcement and intelligence agencies have received indications that Al Qaeda members have sought information on Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems available on multiple SCADA‐related web sites.”27 In addition a number of jihadist websites, such as 7hj.7hj.com, teach computer attack and hacking skills in the service of Islam.28 While al Qaeda may lack the cyber‐attack capability of nations like Russia and China, there is every reason to believe its operatives, and those of its ilk, are as capable as the cyber criminals and hackers who routinely effect great harm on the world’s digital infrastructure generally and American assets specifically. In fact, perhaps, the most troubling indication of the level of the cyberterrorist threat is the countless, serious non‐terrorist cyberattacks routinely carried out by criminals, hackers, disgruntled insiders, crime syndicates and the like. If run‐of‐the‐mill criminals and hackers can threaten powergrids, hack vital military networks, steal vast sums of money, take down a city’s of traffic lights, compromise the Federal Aviation Administration’s air traffic control systems, among other attacks, it is **overwhelmingly likely** that terrorists can carry out similar, if not more malicious attacks. Moreover, even if the world’s terrorists are unable to breed these skills, they can certainly buy them. There are untold numbers of cybermercenaries around the world—sophisticated hackers with advanced training who would be willing to offer their services for the right price. Finally, given the nature of our understanding of cyber threats, there is always the possibility that we have already been the victim or a cyberterrorist attack, or such an attack has already been set but not yet effectuated, and we don’t know it yet. Instead, a well‐designed cyberattack has the capacity **cause widespread chaos**, sow societal unrest, undermine national governments, spread paralyzing fear and anxiety, and create a state of utter turmoil, all without taking a single life. A sophisticated cyberattack could throw a nation’s banking and finance system into chaos causing markets to crash, prompting runs on banks, degrading confidence in markets, perhaps even putting the nation’s currency in play and making the government look helpless and hapless. In today’s difficult economy, imagine how Americans would react if vast sums of money were taken from their accounts and their supporting financial records were destroyed. A truly nefarious cyberattacker could carry out an attack in such a way (akin to Robin Hood) as to engender populist support and deepen rifts within our society, thereby making efforts to restore the system all the more difficult. A modestly advanced enemy could use a cyberattack to shut down (if not physically damage) one or more regional power grids. An entire region could be cast into total darkness, power‐dependent systems could be shutdown. An attack on one or more regional power grids could also cause **cascading effects that could jeopardize our entire national grid**. When word leaks that the blackout was caused by a cyberattack, the specter of a foreign enemy capable of sending the entire nation into darkness would only **increase the fear, turmoil and unrest**. While the finance and energy sectors are considered prime targets for a cyberattack, an attack on any of the 17 delineated critical infrastructure sectors could have a major impact on the United States. For example, our healthcare system is already technologically driven and the Obama Administration’s e‐health efforts will only increase that dependency. A cyberattack on the U.S. e‐health infrastructure could send our healthcare system into chaos and put countless of lives at risk. Imagine if emergency room physicians and surgeons were suddenly no longer able to access vital patient information. A cyberattack on our nation’s water systems could likewise cause **widespread disruption**. An attack on the control systems for one or more dams could put entire communities at risk of being inundated, and could **create ripple effects across the water, agriculture, and energy sectors**. Similar water control system attacks could be used to at least temporarily **deny water to** otherwise **arid regions**, impacting everything from the quality of life in these areas to agriculture. In 2007, the U.S. Cyber Consequences Unit determined that the destruction from a single wave of cyberattacks on critical infrastructures could exceed $700 billion, which would be the rough equivalent of 50 Katrina‐esque hurricanes hitting the United States all at the same time.29 Similarly, one IT security source has estimated that the impact of a single day cyberwar attack that focused on and disrupted U.S. credit and debit card transactions would be approximately $35 billion.30 Another way to gauge the potential for harm is in comparison to other similar noncyberattack infrastructure failures. For example, the August 2003 regional power grid blackout is estimated to have cost the U.S. economy up to $10 billion, or roughly .1 percent of the nation’s GDP. 31 That said, a cyberattack of the exact same magnitude would most certainly have a much larger impact. The origin of the 2003 blackout was almost immediately disclosed as an atypical system failure having nothing to do with terrorism. This made the event both less threatening and likely a single time occurrence. Had it been disclosed that the event was the result of an attack that could readily be repeated the impacts would likely have grown substantially, if not exponentially. Additionally, a cyberattack could also be used to disrupt our nation’s defenses or distract our national leaders in advance of a more traditional conventional or strategic attack. Many military leaders actually believe that such a disruptive cyber pre‐offensive is the most effective use of offensive cyber capabilities. This is, in fact, the way Russia utilized cyberattackers—whether government assets, governmentdirected/ coordinated assets, or allied cyber irregulars—in advance of the invasion of Georgia. Widespread distributed denial of service (DDOS) attacks were launched on the Georgian governments IT systems. Roughly a day later Russian armor rolled into Georgian territory. The cyberattacks were used to prepare the battlefield; they denied the Georgian government a critical communications tool isolating it from its citizens and degrading its command and control capabilities precisely at the time of attack. In this way, these attacks were the functional equivalent of conventional air and/or missile strikes on a nation’s communications infrastructure.32 One interesting element of the Georgian cyberattacks has been generally overlooked: On July 20th, weeks before the August cyberattack, the website of Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili was overwhelmed by a more narrowly focused, but technologically similar DDOS attack.33 This should be particularly chilling to American national security experts as our systems undergo the same sorts of focused, probing attacks on a constant basis. The ability of an enemy to use a cyberattack to counter our offensive capabilities or soften our defenses for a wider offensive against the United States is much more than mere speculation. In fact, in Iraq it is already happening. Iraq insurgents are now using off‐the‐shelf software (costing just $26) to hack U.S. drones (costing $4.5 million each), allowing them to intercept the video feed from these drones.34 By hacking these drones the insurgents have succeeded in greatly reducing one of our most valuable sources of real‐time intelligence and situational awareness. If our enemies in Iraq are capable of such an effective cyberattack against one of our more sophisticated systems, consider what a more technologically advanced enemy could do. At the strategic level, in 2008, as the United States Central Command was leading wars in both Iraq and Afghanistan, a cyber intruder compromised the security of the Command and sat within its IT systems, monitoring everything the Command was doing. 35 This time the attacker simply gathered vast amounts of intelligence. However, it is clear that the attacker could have used this access to wage cyberwar—altering information, disrupting the flow of information, destroying information, taking down systems—against the United States forces already at war. Similarly, during 2003 as the United States prepared for and began the War in Iraq, the IT networks of the Department of Defense were hacked 294 times.36 By August of 2004, with America at war, these ongoing attacks compelled then‐Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz to write in a memo that, "Recent exploits have reduced operational capabilities on our networks."37 This wasn’t the first time that our national security IT infrastructure was penetrated immediately in advance of a U.S. military option.38 In February of 1998 the Solar Sunrise attacks systematically compromised a series of Department of Defense networks. What is often overlooked is that these attacks occurred during the ramp up period ahead of potential military action against Iraq. The attackers were able to obtain vast amounts of sensitive information—information that would have certainly been of value to an enemy’s military leaders. There is no way to prove that these actions were purposefully launched with the specific intent to distract American military assets or degrade our capabilities. However, such ambiguities—the inability to specifically attribute actions and motives to actors—are the very nature of cyberspace. Perhaps, these repeated patterns of behavior were mere coincidence, or perhaps they weren’t. The potential that an enemy might use a cyberattack to soften physical defenses, increase the gravity of harms from kinetic attacks, or both, significantly increases the potential harms from a cyberattack. Consider the gravity of the threat and risk if an enemy, rightly or wrongly, believed that it could use a cyberattack to degrade our strategic weapons capabilities. Such an enemy might be convinced that **it could win a war**—conventional or **even nuclear**—against the United States. The effect of this would be to **undermine our deterrence**‐based defenses, making us **significantly more at risk of a major war**.

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#### Neodymium supplies necessary for wind are limited now but demand is keeping pace – the plan causes massive bottlenecks and price spikes. We are 100% dependent on China.

Cho 9-20 (Cho, analyst and reporter for Phys.org "rare earth metals: will we have enough?" September 20, 2012 phys.org/news/2012-09-rare-earth-metals.html

"To provide most of our power through renewables would take hundreds of times the amount of rare earth metals that we are mining today," said Thomas Graedel, Clifton R. Musser Professor of Industrial Ecology and professor of geology and geophysics at the Yale School of Forestry & Environmental Studies. There is no firm definition of rare earth metals, but the term generally refers to metals used in small quantities. Rare earth metals include: rare earth elements—17 elements in the periodic table, the 15 lanthanides plus scandium and yttrium; six platinum group elements; and other byproduct metals that occur in copper, gold, uranium, phosphates, iron or zinc ores. While many rare earth metals are actually quite common, they are seldom found in sufficient amounts to be extracted economically. According to a recent Congressional Research Service report, world demand for rare earth metals is estimated to be 136,000 tons per year, and projected to rise to at least 185,000 tons annually by 2015. With continued global growth of the middle class, especially in China, India and Africa, demand will continue to grow. High-tech products and renewable energy technology cannot function without rare earth metals. Neodymium, terbium and dysprosium are essential ingredients in the magnets of wind turbines and computer hard drives; a number of rare earth metals are used in nickel-metal-hydride rechargeable batteries that power electric vehicles and many other products; yttrium is necessary for color TVs, fuel cells and fluorescent lamps; europium is a component of compact fluorescent bulbs and TV and iPhone screens; cerium and lanthanum are used in catalytic converters; platinum group metals are needed as catalysts in fuel cell technology; and other rare earth metals are essential for solar cells, cell phones, computer chips, medical imaging, jet engines, defense technology, and much more. Ads by Google Donate Car to Make-A-Wish - Donate Your Car to Help NC Kids Free Towing & Maximum Tax Deduction - WheelsForWishes.org/Make-A-Wish Wind power has grown around 7 percent a year, increasing by a factor of 10 over the last decade, noted Peter Kelemen, Arthur D. Storke Memorial Professor of Geochemistry at the Earth Institute's Lamont-Doherty Earth Observatory. "Every megawatt of electricity needs 200 kilograms of neodymium—or 20 percent of one ton," he said. "So if every big wind turbine produces one megawatt, five turbines will require one ton of neodymium. If wind is going to play a major part in replacing fossil fuels, we will need to increase our supply of neodymium." A recent MIT study projected that neodymium demand could grow by as much as 700 percent over the next 25 years; demand for dysprosium, also needed for wind turbines, could increase by 2,600 percent. China currently supplies 97 percent of global rare earth metal demand, and 100 percent of heavy rare earth metals such as terbium and dysprosium, used in wind turbines. In 2005, it began restricting exports to preserve resources and protect the environment, causing prices to soar. Today, the United States is 100 percent dependent on imports for rare earth metals. From the mid-1960s through the 1980s, however, Molycorp's Mountain Pass mine in California was the world's main source of rare earth metals. As the U.S. share of rare earth metal production declined, China used government support, research and development, training programs, cheap labor and low prices to develop its supply chain, increasing its share of rare earth metal production from 27 percent in 1990 to 97 percent in 2011. In March, the U.S., Japan and the European Union lodged a complaint with the World Trade Organization over China's limits on rare earth exports. In response, China announced that it will export 30,996 more metric tons of rare earth metals in 2012 than it did in 2011.

#### An increase in demand for wind turbines triggers the link – government incentives distort the market

GCC 12 (Green Car Congress, report based on MIT Research "MIT study finds shift to green energy sources could mean crunch in supply of key rare earth elements" 9 March, 2012 www.greencarcongress.com/2012/03/ree-20120309.html)

A large-scale shift from coal-fired electric power plants and gasoline-fueled cars to wind turbines and electric vehicles could increase demand for two already-scarce rare earth elements (REE)—dysprosium and neodymium, available almost exclusively in China—by 600-2,600 percent over the next 25 years, according to a new study published in the ACS journal Environmental Science & Technology. The study by researchers at MIT also points out that production of the two metals has been increasing by only a few percentage points per year. ...the availability of REEs appears to be at risk based on a number of factors. Of particular significance, one country (China) controls 98% of current supply (production). Historically, much lower levels of market concentration have harmed manufacturing firms. For example, in 1978 Zaire controlled 48% of the cobalt supply and yet political unrest in Zaire resulted in a disruption to global supply that became known as the “Cobalt Crisis”. Another contributor to supply risk for REEs is the fact that they are comined; individual REEs are not mined separately. REEs are found together in geological deposits, rendering mining of individual elements economically inefficient. The supply of any individual REE depends on the geology of the deposits, the costs of the extraction technology employed, and the price of the basket of rare earths (RE). Finally, REEs have come under global scrutiny due to the environmental and social conditions under which they are mined, further increasing their supply risk. —Alonso et al. While the literature contains a number of reports that evaluate different aspects of RE availability, Randolph E. Kirchain, Ph.D., and colleagues evaluated future potential demand scenarios for REEs with a focus on the issue of comining. They analyzed the supply of lanthanum, cerium, praseodymium, neodymium, samarium, europium, gadolinium, terbium, dysprosium and yttrium under various scenarios, and projected the demand for these 10 rare earth elements through 2035. In particular, they estimated resource requirements for electric vehicles and windturbines (revolutionary demand areas for REEs) from performance specifications and vehicle sales or turbine deployment projections. Future demand was estimated for a range of scenarios including one developed by the International Energy Agency (IEA) with adoption of electric vehicles and wind turbines at a rate consistent with stabilization of CO2 in the atmosphere at a level of 450 ppm. In one scenario, demand for dysprosium and neodymium could be higher than 2,600 and 700 percent respectively. To meet that need, production of dysprosium would have to grow each year at nearly twice the historic growth rate for rare earth supplies. The applications that will be most negatively affected by constraints in these REEs (i.e., increased costs) will be those dependent upon high performance magnets. Applications such as petroleum refining, which depend on elements whose supply is projected to exceed demand, may be positively affected if primary producers increase overall production to meet the higher demand for specific elements. If a secondary market emerges to meet the higher demand for specific elements (i.e., recycling of magnets, but not catalysts), then, given that the portfolio of recycled REEs would be significantly different from the portfolio of primary supply, the overall supply portfolio of REEs could change. ...In the end, prices are not the only forces that will influence the REE markets. Government intervention in this market is prevalent. Also, corporate social responsibility policies may influence some firm’s decisions to use REE unless environmental concerns around their mining are addressed. These issues should be considered carefully by interested stakeholders and future research on this topic.

#### A supply bottleneck causes War with China –

Anthony 12/30/12 (Lead editor at Ziff Davis, Inc. Owner at SA Holdings Past Columnist at Tecca Editor at Aol (Weblogs, Inc) Educationm University of Essex, http://www.extremetech.com/extreme/111029-rare-earth-crisis-innovate-or-be-crushed-by-china/2)

 The doomsday event that everyone is praying will never come to pass, but which every Western nation is currently planning for, is the eventual cut-off of Chinese rare earth exports. Last year, 97% of the world’s rare earth metals were produced in China — but over the last few years, the Chinese government has been shutting down mines, ostensibly to save what resources it has, and also reducing the amount of rare earth that can be exported. Last year, China produced some 130,000 tons of rare earths, but export restrictions meant that only 35,000 tons were sent to other countries. As a result, demand outside China now outstrips supply by some 40,000 tons per year, and — as expected — many countries are now stockpiling the reserves that they have. Almost every Western country is now digging around in their backyard for rare earth-rich mud and sand, but it’ll probably be too little too late — and anyway, due to geochemistry, there’s no guarantee that explorers and assayers will find what they’re looking for. The price of rare earths are already going up, and so are the non-Chinese-made gadgets and gizmos that use them. Exacerbating the issue yet further, as technology grows more advanced, our reliance on the strange and magical properties of rare earths increases — and China, with the world’s largest workforce and a fire hose of rare earths, is perfectly poised to become the only real producer of solar power photovoltaic cells, computer chips, and more. In short, China has the world by the short hairs, and when combined with a hotting-up cyber front, it’s not hard to see how this situation might devolve into World War III. The alternate, ecological point of view, is that we’re simply living beyond the planet’s means. Either way, strategic and logistic planning to make the most of scarce metals and minerals is now one of the most important tasks that face governments and corporations. Even if large rare earth deposits are found soon, or we start recycling our gadgets in a big way, the only real solution is to somehow lessen our reliance on a finite resource. Just like oil and energy, this will probably require drastic technological leaps. Instead of reducing the amount of tantalum used in capacitors, or indium in LCD displays, we will probably have to discover completely different ways of storing energy or displaying images. My money’s on graphene.

#### Nuclear conflict with China is an EXISTENTIAL risk – causes nuclear winter

#### Wittner 11 (11/30/11 Dr. Lawrence, Prof of History Emeritus at SUNY Albany, “Is a Nuclear War with China Possible?”)

But what would that "victory" entail? An attack with these Chinese nuclear weapons would immediately slaughter at least 10 million Americans in a great storm of blast and fire, while leaving many more dying horribly of sickness and radiation poisoning. The Chinese death toll in a nuclear war would be far higher. Both nations would be reduced to smoldering, radioactive wastelands. Also, radioactive debris sent aloft by the nuclear explosions would blot out the sun and bring on a "nuclear winter" around the globe -- destroying agriculture, creating worldwide famine, and generating chaos and destruction. Moreover, in another decade the extent of this catastrophe would be far worse. The Chinese government is currently expanding its nuclear arsenal, and by the year 2020 it is [expected](http://www.nukestrat.com/china/Book-35-125.pdf) to more than double its number of nuclear weapons that can hit the United States. The U.S. government, in turn, has [plans](http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/oct/30/nuclear-powers-weapons-spending-report) to spend hundreds of billions of dollars "modernizing" its nuclear weapons and nuclear production facilities over the next decade.

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#### Apocalyptic environmental predictions are empirically wrong – no impact

Ronald Bailey 2k, adjunct scholar at the Cato Institute, May, http://reason.com/0005/fe.rb.earth.shtml

Earth Day 1970 provoked a torrent of apocalyptic predictions. “We have about five more years at the outside to do something,” ecologist Kenneth Watt declared to a Swarthmore College audience on April 19, 1970. Harvard biologist George Wald estimated that “civilization will end within 15 or 30 years unless immediate action is taken against problems facing mankind.” “We are in an environmental crisis which threatens the survival of this nation, and of the world as a suitable place of human habitation,” wrote Washington University biologist Barry Commoner in the Earth Day issue of the scholarly journal Environment. The day after Earth Day, even the staid New York Times editorial page warned, “Man must stop pollution and conserve his resources, not merely to enhance existence but to save the race from intolerable deterioration and possible extinction.” Very Apocalypse Now. Three decades later, of course, the world hasn’t come to an end; if anything, the planet’s ecological future has never looked so promising. With half a billion people suiting up around the globe for Earth Day 2000, now is a good time to look back on the predictions made at the first Earth Day and see how they’ve held up and what we can learn from them. The short answer: The prophets of doom were not simply wrong, but *spectacularly wrong*. More important, many contemporary environmental alarmists are similarly mistaken when they continue to insist that the Earth’s future remains an eco-tragedy that has already entered its final act. Such doomsters not only fail to appreciate the huge environmental gains made over the past 30 years, they ignore the simple fact that increased wealth, population, and technological innovation don’t degrade and destroy the environment. Rather, such developments preserve and enrich the environment. If it is impossible to predict fully the future, it is nonetheless possible to learn from the past. And the best lesson we can learn from revisiting the discourse surrounding the very first Earth Day is that passionate concern, however sincere, is no substitute for rational analysis.

#### Framing issue – the aff doesn’t ban mountain-top removal mining - all of their authors advocate this as a prior move to solve -

#### Legislation to ban mountaintop removal mining must come first to solve

Perks ‘9

Rob, Natural Resources Defense Council, “Time to End Mountaintop Removal Coal Mining”

Nowhere is the debate over how far we are willing to go for inexpensive energy more contentious than in the coalfields of Appalachia. It is there—between the hollows of West Virginia, beyond the bluegrass of Kentucky, bordering the Blue Ridge of Virginia, and above the smoky vistas of Tennessee—where mining companies are blowing up America’s oldest mountains to get the coal beneath the peaks. Without a doubt, mountaintop removal is the world’s worst coal mining. Often referred to as “strip mining on steroids,” it is scarring the landscape and threatening communities throughout Appalachia. Instead of extracting the coal by underground mining, mountaintop removal uses explosive charges and large machinery to remove the mountain and get to the coal. More than 500 mountaintops have already been destroyed and more than one million acres of forest have been clearcut. Well over a thousand miles of valley streams have been buried under tons of rubble, polluting drinking water and threatening the health and safety of all who make their home in the region. Ultimately, mountaintop removal is a symptom of failed federal energy and environmental policy and a conscious effort on the part of the mining industry itself to keep consumers, businesses, financers and state and local government in the dark about the extent of extraction-related harm from coal use. The Natural Resources Defense Council’s (NRDC) position on mountaintop removal is clear: the solution to the ecological, economic, and cultural harm inflicted by this controversial mining practice is not to mend it, but to end it.

#### Their Appalachia biodiversity hotspot evidence has no warrant or internal link to global biodiversity

#### Their Zeller “test case” evidence indicates the plan would preserve coal in Appalachia – no shift to sustainable development

**Zeller 10** [[TOM ZELLER Jr.](http://topics.nytimes.com/topics/reference/timestopics/people/z/tom_jr_zeller/index.html?inline=nyt-per) “A Battle in Mining Country Pits Coal Against Wind,” New York Times, Published: August 14, 2010, pg. http://tinyurl.com/8ctubyz

Ms. Scarbro reckons that curbing mountaintop removal, by whatever means, would not only protect some of that diversity — and perhaps help lure more tourists — but would also create more coal jobs, because it would make coal companies go back to more labor-intensive underground mining. That would presumably include an expansion of jobs at Coal River Mountain, which has long been mined from below.

#### And it is too late to solve – over 500 mountaintops already destroyed. The signal is ineffective if you can’t clean up Appalachia

Coal inevitable globally

Morse, ’12 (Richard K. is Director of Research on Coal and Carbon Markets at Stanford University's Program on Energy and Sustainable Development, “Cleaning Up Coal: From Climate Culprit to Solution”, *Foreign Affairs;* 91. 4, Jul/Aug 2012: 102-112, Proquest, )

 Coal Fever

In order to confront the coal problem, it is important to understand how the fuel became so popular in the first place. Although coal is often cast as an environmental villain today, just four decades ago, it seemed the obvious answer to some of the developed world's most pressing political and economic challenges. The oil crises of the 1970s showed industrialized countries that disruptions in the supply of petroleum could send shockwaves not only through their transportation systems but, because much electricity was generated by burning oil products, through their power sectors, too. So they rushed to replace cartel-controlled oil with abundant, cheap coal. Between 1980 and 2000, countries that were members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (oecd) increased the use of coal in electricity generation by 61 percent and reduced the use of oil in that sector by 41 percent. Formerly dispersed in niche regional markets, the international trade in coal grew into a sophisticated global commodities exchange and quadrupled in size. Stable, diversified networks of suppliers oaered coal-importing countries low energy costs and enhanced energy security. No longer were electricity prices vulnerable to instability in the Middle East. Swapping oil for coal paid handsome dividends. By the 1990s, however, natural gas had emerged as a competitive alternative for generating electricity in the developed world, and the coal fever that had been gripping Western capitals started cooling oa. Between 2000 and 2008, the use of coal for power generation in oecd countries grew by only four percent, while the use of natural gas increased by 55 percent. Coal's future in the developed world looks bleaker every year. Today, experts predict that coal demand in the oecd countries will remain flat, and may even shrink, from now until 2035. In the United States, coal is losing market share thanks to newly cheap natural gas (a consequence of the shale gas boom) and tighter federal pollution regulations. In Europe, the main threat to coal comes from environmental policies. The capstone of the eu's climate policy, the eu Emissions Trading System, which was launched in 2005, has caused countries to shiftto cleaner natural gas. Renewable-energy mandates, meanwhile, have also started pushing coal out of the market. The rest of the world is racing in the opposite direction. Whereas industrialized countries once embraced coal to diversify their energy supplies, by the 1990s, the developing world was turning to it to answer a diaerent problem: poverty. Rapidly growing economies needed more and more electricity, and coal was the cheapest and most practical way to get it. It was not the cleanest energy source, to be sure, but developing countries saw pollution as a cost worth incurring in order to obtain the benefits of a modern economy. As the Indian economist Rajendra Pachauri, chair of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, has asked, "Can you imagine 400 million people who do not have a light bulb in their homes?" He continued, "You cannot, in a democracy, ignore some of these realities. . . . We really don't have any choice but to use coal." As the developing world keeps growing, coal will remain its fuel of choice. The iea expects coal demand in non-oecd countries to nearly double by 2035 if current policies continue, with Chinese and Indian demand alone accounting for more than 80 percent of that growth. Indonesia, Vietnam, and much of the rest of Asia are also rapidly building new coal plants. The coal markets of Asia are thus at the heart of the global-warming problem. The case of China, the world's biggest carbon emitter, demonstrates just how hard it is to give up the fuel.

### politics

**No Iran war and no extinction**

**Riedel 12** – Senior Fellow in the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution and a professor at Georgetown University (Bruce, 01/20, “Iran is not an existential threat,” http://thedailynewsegypt.com/global-views/iran-is-not-an-existential-threat.html)

The danger of war is growing again over Iran's nuclear ambitions. Iran is rattling its sabers, the Republican presidential candidates and others are rattling theirs. But even if Iran gets the bomb, Israel will have overwhelming military superiority over Iran, a fact that should not be lost in all the heated rhetoric. Former head of the Mossad, Meir Dagan, says Iran won't get the bomb until at least 2015. In contrast, Israel has had nuclear weapons since the late 1960s and has jealously guarded its monopoly on them in the region. Israel has used force in the past against developing nuclear threats. Iraq in 1981 and Syria in 2007 were the targets of highly effective Israeli air strikes against developing nuclear weapons programs. Israel has seriously considered conducting such a strike against Iran and may well do so especially now that it has special bunker-busting bombs from the US. Estimates of the size of the Israeli arsenal by international think tanks generally concur that Israel has about 100 nuclear weapons, possibly 200. Even under a crash program, Iran won't achieve an arsenal that size for many years — perhaps decades. Israel also has multiple delivery systems. It has intermediate range ballistic missiles, the Jericho, that are capable of reaching any target in Iran. Its fleet of F15 long-range strike aircraft can also deliver nuclear payloads. Some analysts have suggested that it can also deliver nuclear weapons from its German-made Dolphin submarines using cruise missiles. Israel will also continue to have conventional military superiority over Iran and the rest of the region. The Israel Defense Forces has a demonstrated qualitative edge over all of its potential adversaries in the region, including Iran. The Israeli air force has the capability to penetrate air defense systems with virtual impunity as it demonstrated in 2007 when it destroyed Syria's nascent nuclear capability. The IDF's intelligence and electronic warfare capabilities are vastly superior to its potential rivals. The 2006 Lebanon war and the 2009 Gaza war demonstrated that there are limits to Israel's conventional capabilities but those limits should not obscure the underlying reality of Israel's conventional military superiority over its enemies. Iran, on the other hand, has never fully rebuilt its conventional military from the damage suffered in the Iran-Iraq war. It still relies heavily for air and sea power on equipment purchased by the Shah 40 years ago, much of which is antique today. Moreover, the June 2010 United Nations sanctions, UN Security Council resolution 1929, impose a very stringent arms ban on Iran. Virtually all significant weapons systems — tanks, aircraft, naval vessels, missiles, etc — are banned from sale or transfer to Iran. Training and technical assistance for such systems is also banned. In other words, even if Iran wants to try to improve its conventional military capability in the next few years and has the money to do so, the UN arms ban will make that close to impossible. Iran does not have the capability to produce state-of-the-art weapons on its own, despite its occasional claims of self-sufficiency. It certainly cannot build a modern air force to compete with the IDF on its own. Finally, Israel will continue to enjoy the support of the world's only superpower for the foreseeable future. Assistance from the United States includes roughly $3 billion in aid every year. That is the longest running financial assistance program in American history, dating back to the 1973 war. It is never challenged or cut by Congress and permits Israeli planners to do multi-year planning for defense acquisitions with great certitude about what they can afford to acquire. When Texas Governor Rick Perry suggested cutting aid to Israel to zero in one Republican debate, his poll numbers plummeted. He backtracked fast. US assistance is also far more than just financial aid. The Pentagon and Israel engage in constant exchanges of technical cooperation in virtually all elements of the modern battle field. Missile defense has been at the center of this exchange for over 20 years now. The United States and Israel also have a robust and dynamic intelligence relationship, which helps ensure Israel's qualitative edge. Every American president from Richard Nixon to Barack Obama has been a supporter of maintaining Israel's qualitative edge over its potential foes, including US allies like Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Iran, in contrast, has no major power providing it with financial help. Its arms relationships with Russia and China have been severed by Security Council Resolution 1929. Its only military ally is Syria, not exactly a powerhouse. And Syria is now in the midst of a civil war; its army is dissolving. If President Bashar Al-Assad falls, Iran is the biggest loser in the "Arab spring". Hezbollah will be the second largest loser. The deputy secretary general of Hezbollah and one of its founders, Sheikh Naim Qassem, wrote in 2007 that Syria is "the cornerstone" of Hezbollah’s survival in the region. While Syria and Hezbollah have their differences, the relationship is a "necessity" for Hezbollah. So don't let the hot air from Tehran or the Republican debates confuse the reality on the ground. Iran is a dangerous country but it is not an existential threat to either Israel or America.

#### U.S. diplomacy solves retaliation during strikes

Kroenig 12, nuclear security fellow – CFR

(Matthew, “Time to Attack Iran,” Foreign Affairs Vol. 91, Iss. 1, January/February)

To begin with, critics note, U.S. military action could easily spark a full-blown war. Iran might retaliate against U.S. troops or allies, launching missiles at military installations or civilian populations in the Gulf or perhaps even Europe. It could activate its proxies abroad, stirring sectarian tensions in Iraq, disrupting the Arab Spring, and ordering terrorist attacks against Israel and the United States. This could draw Israel or other states into the fighting and compel the United States to escalate the conflict in response. Powerful allies of Iran, including China and Russia, may attempt to economically and diplomatically isolate the United States. In the midst of such spiraling violence, neither side may see a clear path out of the battle, resulting in a long-lasting, devastating war, whose impact may critically damage the United States' standing in the Muslim world.

Those wary of a U.S. strike also point out that Iran could retaliate by attempting to close the Strait of Hormuz, the narrow access point to the Persian Gulf through which roughly 20 percent of the world's oil supply travels. And even if Iran did not threaten the strait, speculators, fearing possible supply disruptions, would bid up the price of oil, possibly triggering a wider economic crisis at an already fragile moment.

None of these outcomes is predetermined, however; indeed, the United States could do much to mitigate them. Tehran would certainly feel like it needed to respond to a U.S. attack, in order to reestablish deterrence and save face domestically. But it would also likely seek to calibrate its actions to avoid starting a conflict that could lead to the destruction of its military or the regime itself. In all likelihood, the Iranian leadership would resort to its worst forms of retaliation, such as closing the Strait of Hormuz or launching missiles at southern Europe, only if it felt that its very existence was threatened. A targeted U.S. operation need not threaten Tehran in such a fundamental way.

To make sure it doesn't and to reassure the Iranian regime, the United States could first make clear that it is interested only in destroying Iran's nuclear program, not in overthrowing the government. It could then identify certain forms of retaliation to which it would respond with devastating military action, such as attempting to close the Strait of Hormuz, conducting massive and sustained attacks on Gulf states and U.S. troops or ships, or launching terrorist attacks in the United States itself. Washington would then need to clearly articulate these "redlines" to Tehran during and after the attack to ensure that the message was not lost in battle. And it would need to accept the fact that it would have to absorb Iranian responses that fell short of these redlines without escalating the conflict. This might include accepting token missile strikes against U.S. bases and ships in the region--several salvos over the course of a few days that soon taper off--or the harassment of commercial and U.S. naval vessels. To avoid the kind of casualties that could compel the White House to escalate the struggle, the United States would need to evacuate nonessential personnel from U.S. bases within range of Iranian missiles and ensure that its troops were safely in bunkers before Iran launched its response. Washington might also need to allow for stepped-up support to Iran's proxies in Afghanistan and Iraq and missile and terrorist attacks against Israel. In doing so, it could induce Iran to follow the path of Iraq and Syria, both of which refrained from starting a war after Israel struck their nuclear reactors in 1981 and 2007, respectively.

Even if Tehran did cross Washington's redlines, the United States could still manage the confrontation. At the outset of any such violation, it could target the Iranian weapons that it finds most threatening to prevent Tehran from deploying them. To de-escalate the situation quickly and prevent a wider regional war, the United States could also secure the agreement of its allies to avoid responding to an Iranian attack. This would keep other armies, particularly the Israel Defense Forces, out of the fray. Israel should prove willing to accept such an arrangement in exchange for a U.S. promise to eliminate the Iranian nuclear threat. Indeed, it struck a similar agreement with the United States during the Gulf War, when it refrained from responding to the launching of Scud missiles by Saddam Hussein.

#### Protectionism doesn’t cause war

Martin 8(Phillipe, University of Paris 1 Pantheon—Sorbonne, Paris School of Economics, and Centre for Economic Policy Research; Thierry MAYER, University of Paris 1 Pantheon—Sorbonne, Paris School of Economics, CEPII, and Centre for Economic Policy Research, Mathias THOENIG, University of Geneva and Paris School of Economics, The Review of Economic Studies 75)

Does globalization pacify international relations? The “liberal” view in political science argues that increasing trade flows and the spread of free markets and democracy should limit the incentive to use military force in interstate relations. This vision, which can partly be traced back to Kant’s Essay on Perpetual Peace (1795), has been very influential: The main objective of the European trade integration process was to prevent the killing and destruction of the two World Wars from ever happening again.1 Figure 1 suggests2 however, that during the 1870–2001 period, the correlation between trade openness and military conflicts is not a clear cut one. The first era of globalization, at the end of the 19th century, was a period of rising trade openness and multiple military conflicts, culminating with World War I. Then, the interwar period was characterized by a simultaneous collapse of world trade and conflicts. After World War II, world trade increased rapidly, while the number of conflicts decreased (although the risk of a global conflict was obviously high). There is no clear evidence that the 1990s, during which trade flows increased dramatically, was a period of lower prevalence of military conflicts, even taking into account the increase in the number of sovereign states.

#### No protectionism

Ikenson 9

[Daniel, associate director of the Center for Trade Policy Studies at the Cato Institute, “ A Protectionism Fling: Why Tariff Hikes and Other Trade Barriers Will Be Short-Lived,” March 12, 2009, http://www.cato.org/pub\_display.php?pub\_id=10651]

Although some governments will dabble in some degree of protectionism, the combination of a sturdy rules-based system of trade and the economic self interest in being open to participation in the global economy will limit the risk of a protectionist pandemic. According to recent estimates from the International Food Policy Research Institute, if all WTO members were to raise all of their applied tariffs to the maximum bound rates, the average global rate of duty would double and the value of global trade would decline by 7.7 percent over five years.8 That would be a substantial decline relative to the 5.5 percent annual rate of trade growth experienced this decade.9 But, to put that 7.7 percent decline in historical perspective, the value of global trade declined by 66 percent between 1929 and 1934, a period mostly in the wake of Smoot Hawley's passage in 1930.10 So the potential downside today from what Bergsten calls "legal protectionism" is actually not that "massive," even if all WTO members raised all of their tariffs to the highest permissible rates. If most developing countries raised their tariffs to their bound rates, there would be an adverse impact on the countries that raise barriers and on their most important trade partners. But most developing countries that have room to backslide (i.e., not China) are not major importers, and thus the impact on global trade flows would not be that significant. OECD countries and China account for the top twothirds of global import value.11 Backsliding from India, Indonesia, and Argentina (who collectively account for 2.4 percent of global imports) is not going to be the spark that ignites a global trade war. Nevertheless, governments are keenly aware of the events that transpired in the 1930s, and have made various pledges to avoid protectionist measures in combating the current economic situation. In the United States, after President Obama publicly registered his concern that the "Buy American" provision in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act might be perceived as protectionist or could incite a trade war, Congress agreed to revise the legislation to stipulate that the Buy American provision "be applied in a manner consistent with United States obligations under international agreements." In early February, China's vice commerce minister, Jiang Zengwei, announced that China would not include "Buy China" provisions in its own $586 billion stimulus bill.12 But even more promising than pledges to avoid trade provocations are actions taken to reduce existing trade barriers. In an effort to "reduce business operating costs, attract and retain foreign investment, raise business productivity, and provide consumers a greater variety and better quality of goods and services at competitive prices," the Mexican government initiated a plan in January to unilaterally reduce tariffs on about 70 percent of the items on its tariff schedule. Those 8,000 items, comprising 20 different industrial sectors, accounted for about half of all Mexican import value in 2007. When the final phase of the plan is implemented on January 1, 2013, the average industrial tariff rate in Mexico will have fallen from 10.4 percent to 4.3 percent.13 And Mexico is not alone. In February, the Brazilian government suspended tariffs entirely on some capital goods imports and reduced to 2 percent duties on a wide variety of machinery and other capital equipment, and on communications and information technology products.14 That decision came on the heels of late-January decision in Brazil to scrap plans for an import licensing program that would have affected 60 percent of the county's imports.15 Meanwhile, on February 27, a new free trade agreement was signed between Australia, New Zealand, and the 10 member countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations to reduce and ultimately eliminate tariffs on 96 percent of all goods by 2020. While the media and members of the trade policy community fixate on how various protectionist measures around the world might foreshadow a plunge into the abyss, there is plenty of evidence that governments remain interested in removing barriers to trade. Despite the occasional temptation to indulge discredited policies, there is a growing body of institutional knowledge that when people are free to engage in commerce with one another as they choose, regardless of the nationality or location of the other parties, they can leverage that freedom to accomplish economic outcomes far more impressive than when governments attempt to limit choices through policy constraints.

#### No impact to liberal international diplomacy

Walt 12 – the Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international affairs at Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government (Stephen M., 09/11, “Why are U.S. leaders so obsessed with credibility?” http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/09/11/the\_credibility\_fetish)

I call this error the "credibility fetish." U.S. leaders have continued to believe that our security depends on convincing both allies and adversaries that we are steadfast, loyal, reliable, etc., and that our security guarantees are iron-clad. It is a formula that reinforces diplomatic rigidity, because it requires us to keep doing things to keep allies happy and issuing threats (or in some cases, taking actions) to convince foes that we are serious. And while it might have made some degree of sense during the Cold War, it is increasingly counterproductive today. One could argue that credibility did matter during the Cold War. The United States did face a serious peer competitor in those days, and the Soviet Union did have impressive military capabilities. Although a direct Soviet attack on vital U.S. interests was always unlikely, one could at least imagine certain events that might have shifted the global balance of power dramatically. For example, had the Soviet Union been able to conquer Western Europe or the Persian Gulf and incorporate these assets into its larger empire, it would have had serious consequences for the United States. Accordingly, U.S. leaders worked hard to make sure that the U.S. commitment to NATO was credible, and we did similar things to bolster U.S. credibility in Asia and the Gulf. Of course, we probably overstated the importance of "credibility" even then. Sloppy analogies like the infamous "domino theory" helped convince Americans that we had to fight in places that didn't matter (e.g., Vietnam) in order to convince everyone that we'd also be willing to fight in places that did. We also managed to convince ourselves that credible nuclear deterrence depended on having a mythical ability to "prevail" in an all-out nuclear exchange, even though winning would have had little meaning once a few dozen missiles had been fired. Nonetheless, in the rigid, bipolar context of the Cold War, it made sense for the United States to pay some attention to its credibility as an alliance leader and security provider. But today, the United States faces no peer competitor, and it is hard to think of any single event that would provoke a rapid and decisive shift in the global balance of power. Instead of a clear geopolitical rival, we face a group of medium powers: some of them friendly (Germany, the UK, Japan, etc.) and some of them partly antagonistic (Russia, China). Yet Russia is economically linked to our NATO allies, and China is a major U.S. trading partner and has been a major financier of U.S. debt. This not your parents' Cold War. There are also influential regional powers such as Turkey, India, or Brazil, with whom the U.S. relationship is mixed: We agree on some issues and are at odds on others. And then there are clients who depend on U.S. protection (Israel, Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan, Taiwan, etc.) but whose behavior often creates serious headaches for whoever is in the White House. As distinguished diplomat Chas Freeman recently commented, "the complexity and dynamism of the new order place a premium on diplomatic agility. Stolid constancy and loyalty to pre-existing alliance relationship are not the self-evident virtues they once were. We should not be surprised that erstwhile allies put their own interest ahead of ours and act accordingly. Where it is to our long-term advantage, we should do the same." What might this mean in practice? As I've noted repeatedly, it means beginning by recognizing that the United States is both very powerful and very secure, and that there's hardly anything that could happen in the international system that would alter the global balance of power overnight. The balance is shifting, to be sure, but these adjustments will take place over the course of decades. Weaker states who would like U.S. protection need it a lot more than we need them, which means our "credibility" is more their problem than ours. Which in turn means that if other states want our help, they should be willing to do a lot to convince us to provide it. Instead of obsessing about our own "credibility," in short, and bending over backwards to convince the Japanese, South Koreans, Singaporeans, Afghans, Israelis, Saudis, and others that we will do whatever it takes to protect them, we ought to be asking them what they are going to do for themselves, and also for us. And instead of spending all our time trying to scare the bejeezus out of countries like Iran (which merely reinforces their interest in getting some sort of deterrent), we ought to be reminding them over and over that we have a lot to offer and are open to better relations, even if the clerical regime remains in power and maybe even if -- horrors! -- it retains possession of the full nuclear fuel cycle (under IAEA safeguards). If nothing else, adopting a less confrontational posture is bound to complicate their own calculations. This is not an argument for Bush-style unilateralism, or for a retreat to Fortress America. Rather, it is a call for greater imagination and flexibility in how we deal with friends and foes alike. I'm not saying that we should strive for zero credibility, of course; I'm merely saying that we'd be better off if other states understood that our credibility was more conditional. In other words, allies need to be reminded that our help is conditional on their compliance with our interests (at least to some degree) and adversaries should also be reminded that our opposition is equally conditional on what they do. In both cases we also need to recognize that we are rarely going to get other states to do everything we want. Above all, it is a call to recognize that our geopolitical position, military power, and underlying economic strength give us the luxury of being agile in precisely the way that Freeman depicts. Of course, some present U.S. allies would be alarmed by the course I'm suggesting, because it would affect the sweetheart deals they've been enjoying for years. They'll tell us they are losing confidence in our leadership, and they'll threaten to go neutral, or maybe even align with our adversaries. Where possible, they will enlist Americans who are sympathetic to their plight to pressure on U.S. politicians to offer new assurances. In most cases, however, such threats don't need to be taken seriously. And we just have to patiently explain to them that we're not necessarily abandoning them, we are merely 1) making our support more conditional on their cooperation with us on things we care about, and 2) remaining open to improving relations with other countries, including some countries that some of our current allies might have doubts about. I know: It's a radical position: we are simply going to pursue the American national interest, instead of letting our allies around the world define it for us. The bottom line is that the United States is in a terrific position to play realpolitik on a global scale, precisely because it needs alliance partners less than most of its partners do. And even when allies are of considerable value to us, we still have the most leverage in nearly every case. As soon as we start obsessing about our credibility, however, we hand that leverage back to our weaker partners and we constrain our ability to pursue meaningful diplomatic solutions to existing conflicts. Fetishizing credibility, in short, is one of the reasons American diplomacy has achieved relatively little since the end of the Cold War.

#### No terror impact

Smith and Herron 5 \*Professor, University of Oklahoma, \* University of Oklahoma Norman Campus, (Hank C. Jenkins-Smith, Ph.D., and Kerry G., "United States Public Response to Terrorism: Fault Lines or Bedrock?" Review of Policy Research 22.5 (2005): 599-623, <http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1000&context=hjsmith>)

Our final contrasting set of expectations relates to the degree to which the public will support or demand retribution against terrorists and supporting states. Here our data show that support for using conventional United States military force to retaliate against terrorists initially averaged above midscale, but did not reach a high level of demand for military action. Initial support declined significantly across all demographic and belief categories by the time of our survey in 2002. Furthermore, panelists both in 2001 and 2002 preferred that high levels of certainty about culpability (above 8.5 on a scale from zero to ten) be established before taking military action. Again, we find the weight of evidence supporting revisionist expectations of public opinion. Overall, these results are inconsistent with the contention that highly charged events will result in volatile and unstructured responses among mass publics that prove problematic for policy processes. The initial response to the terrorist strikes demonstrated a broad and consistent shift in public assessments toward a greater perceived threat from terrorism, and greater willingness to support policies to reduce that threat. But even in the highly charged context of such a serious attack on the American homeland, the overall public response was quite measured. On average, the public showed very little propensity to undermine speech protections, and initial willingness to engage in military retaliation moderated significantly over the following year. Perhaps most interesting is that the greatest propensity to change beliefs between 2001 and 2002 was evident among the best-educated and wealthiest of our respondents— hardly the expected source of volatility, but in this case they may have represented the leading edge of belief constraints reasserting their influence in the first year following 9/11. This post-9/11 change also reflected an increasing delineation of policy preferences by ideological and partisan positions. Put differently, those whose beliefs changed the most in the year between surveys also were those with the greatest access to and facility with information (the richest, best educated), and the nature of the changes was entirely consistent with a structured and coherent pattern of public beliefs. Overall, we find these patterns to be quite reassuring, and consistent with the general findings of the revisionist theorists of public opinion. Our data suggest that while United States public opinion may exhibit some fault lines in times of crises, it remains securely anchored in bedrock beliefs.

#### No nuclear terror

Mueller 10 (John, professor of political science at Ohio State, Calming Our Nuclear Jitters, Issues in Science and Technology, Winter, <http://www.issues.org/26.2/mueller.html>)

Politicians of all stripes preach to an anxious, appreciative, and very numerous choir when they, like President Obama, proclaim atomic terrorism to be “the most immediate and extreme threat to global security.” It is the problem that, according to Defense Secretary Robert Gates, currently keeps every senior leader awake at night. This is hardly a new anxiety. In 1946, atomic bomb maker J. Robert Oppenheimer ominously warned that if three or four men could smuggle in units for an atomic bomb, they could blow up New York. This was an early expression of a pattern of dramatic risk inflation that has persisted throughout the nuclear age. In fact, although expanding fires and fallout might increase the effective destructive radius, the blast of a Hiroshima-size device would “blow up” about 1% of the city’s area—a tragedy, of course, but not the same as one 100 times greater. In the early 1970s, nuclear physicist Theodore Taylor proclaimed the atomic terrorist problem to be “immediate,” explaining at length “how comparatively easy it would be to steal nuclear material and step by step make it into a bomb.” At the time he thought it was already too late to “prevent the making of a few bombs, here and there, now and then,” or “in another ten or fifteen years, it will be too late.” Three decades after Taylor, we continue to wait for terrorists to carry out their “easy” task. In contrast to these predictions, terrorist groups seem to have exhibited only limited desire and even less progress in going atomic. This may be because, after brief exploration of the possible routes, they, unlike generations of alarmists, have discovered that the tremendous effort required is scarcely likely to be successful. The most plausible route for terrorists, according to most experts, would be to manufacture an atomic device themselves from purloined fissile material (plutonium or, more likely, highly enriched uranium). This task, however, remains a daunting one, requiring that a considerable series of difficult hurdles be conquered and in sequence. Outright armed theft of fissile material is exceedingly unlikely not only because of the resistance of guards, but because chase would be immediate. A more promising approach would be to corrupt insiders to smuggle out the required substances. However, this requires the terrorists to pay off a host of greedy confederates, including brokers and money-transmitters, any one of whom could turn on them or, either out of guile or incompetence, furnish them with stuff that is useless. Insiders might also consider the possibility that once the heist was accomplished, the terrorists would, as analyst Brian Jenkins none too delicately puts it, “have every incentive to cover their trail, beginning with eliminating their confederates.” If terrorists were somehow successful at obtaining a sufficient mass of relevant material, they would then probably have to transport it a long distance over unfamiliar terrain and probably while being pursued by security forces. Crossing international borders would be facilitated by following established smuggling routes, but these are not as chaotic as they appear and are often under the watch of suspicious and careful criminal regulators. If border personnel became suspicious of the commodity being smuggled, some of them might find it in their interest to disrupt passage, perhaps to collect the bounteous reward money that would probably be offered by alarmed governments once the uranium theft had been discovered. Once outside the country with their precious booty, terrorists would need to set up a large and well-equipped machine shop to manufacture a bomb and then to populate it with a very select team of highly skilled scientists, technicians, machinists, and administrators. The group would have to be assembled and retained for the monumental task while no consequential suspicions were generated among friends, family, and police about their curious and sudden absence from normal pursuits back home. Members of the bomb-building team would also have to be utterly devoted to the cause, of course, and they would have to be willing to put their lives and certainly their careers at high risk, because after their bomb was discovered or exploded they would probably become the targets of an intense worldwide dragnet operation. Some observers have insisted that it would be easy for terrorists to assemble a crude bomb if they could get enough fissile material. But Christoph Wirz and Emmanuel Egger, two senior physicists in charge of nuclear issues at Switzerland‘s Spiez Laboratory, bluntly conclude that the task “could hardly be accomplished by a subnational group.” They point out that precise blueprints are required, not just sketches and general ideas, and that even with a good blueprint the terrorist group would most certainly be forced to redesign. They also stress that the work is difficult, dangerous, and extremely exacting, and that the technical requirements in several fields verge on the unfeasible. Stephen Younger, former director of nuclear weapons research at Los Alamos Laboratories, has made a similar argument, pointing out that uranium is “exceptionally difficult to machine” whereas “plutonium is one of the most complex metals ever discovered, a material whose basic properties are sensitive to exactly how it is processed.“ Stressing the “daunting problems associated with material purity, machining, and a host of other issues,” Younger concludes, “to think that a terrorist group, working in isolation with an unreliable supply of electricity and little access to tools and supplies” could fabricate a bomb “is farfetched at best.” Under the best circumstances, the process of making a bomb could take months or even a year or more, which would, of course, have to be carried out in utter secrecy. In addition, people in the area, including criminals, may observe with increasing curiosity and puzzlement the constant coming and going of technicians unlikely to be locals. If the effort to build a bomb was successful, the finished product, weighing a ton or more, would then have to be transported to and smuggled into the relevant target country where it would have to be received by collaborators who are at once totally dedicated and technically proficient at handling, maintaining, detonating, and perhaps assembling the weapon after it arrives. The financial costs of this extensive and extended operation could easily become monumental. There would be expensive equipment to buy, smuggle, and set up and people to pay or pay off. Some operatives might work for free out of utter dedication to the cause, but the vast conspiracy also requires the subversion of a considerable array of criminals and opportunists, each of whom has every incentive to push the price for cooperation as high as possible. Any criminals competent and capable enough to be effective allies are also likely to be both smart enough to see boundless opportunities for extortion and psychologically equipped by their profession to be willing to exploit them. Those who warn about the likelihood of a terrorist bomb contend that a terrorist group could, if with great difficulty, overcome each obstacle and that doing so in each case is “not impossible.” But although it may not be impossible to surmount each individual step, the likelihood that a group could surmount a series of them quickly becomes vanishingly small. Table 1 attempts to catalogue the barriers that must be overcome under the scenario considered most likely to be successful. In contemplating the task before them, would-be atomic terrorists would effectively be required to go though an exercise that looks much like this. If and when they do, they will undoubtedly conclude that their prospects are daunting and accordingly uninspiring or even terminally dispiriting. It is possible to calculate the chances for success. Adopting probability estimates that purposely and heavily bias the case in the terrorists’ favor—for example, assuming the terrorists have a 50% chance of overcoming each of the 20 obstacles—the chances that a concerted effort would be successful comes out to be less than one in a million. If one assumes, somewhat more realistically, that their chances at each barrier are one in three, the cumulative odds that they will be able to pull off the deed drop to one in well over three billion. Other routes would-be terrorists might take to acquire a bomb are even more problematic. They are unlikely to be given or sold a bomb by a generous like-minded nuclear state for delivery abroad because the risk would be high, even for a country led by extremists, that the bomb (and its source) would be discovered even before delivery or that it would be exploded in a manner and on a target the donor would not approve, including on the donor itself. Another concern would be that the terrorist group might be infiltrated by foreign intelligence. The terrorist group might also seek to steal or illicitly purchase a “loose nuke“ somewhere. However, it seems probable that none exist. All governments have an intense interest in controlling any weapons on their territory because of fears that they might become the primary target. Moreover, as technology has developed, finished bombs have been out-fitted with devices that trigger a non-nuclear explosion that destroys the bomb if it is tampered with. And there are other security techniques: Bombs can be kept disassembled with the component parts stored in separate high-security vaults, and a process can be set up in which two people and multiple codes are required not only to use the bomb but to store, maintain, and deploy it. As Younger points out, “only a few people in the world have the knowledge to cause an unauthorized detonation of a nuclear weapon.” There could be dangers in the chaos that would emerge if a nuclear state were to utterly collapse; Pakistan is frequently cited in this context and sometimes North Korea as well. However, even under such conditions, nuclear weapons would probably remain under heavy guard by people who know that a purloined bomb might be used in their own territory. They would still have locks and, in the case of Pakistan, the weapons would be disassembled. The al Qaeda factor The degree to which al Qaeda, the only terrorist group that seems to want to target the United States, has pursued or even has much interest in a nuclear weapon may have been exaggerated. The 9/11 Commission stated that “al Qaeda has tried to acquire or make nuclear weapons for at least ten years,” but the only substantial evidence it supplies comes from an episode that is supposed to have taken place about 1993 in Sudan, when al Qaeda members may have sought to purchase some uranium that turned out to be bogus. Information about this supposed venture apparently comes entirely from Jamal al Fadl, who defected from al Qaeda in 1996 after being caught stealing $110,000 from the organization. Others, including the man who allegedly purchased the uranium, assert that although there were various other scams taking place at the time that may have served as grist for Fadl, the uranium episode never happened. As a key indication of al Qaeda’s desire to obtain atomic weapons, many have focused on a set of conversations in Afghanistan in August 2001 that two Pakistani nuclear scientists reportedly had with Osama bin Laden and three other al Qaeda officials. Pakistani intelligence officers characterize the discussions as “academic” in nature. It seems that the discussion was wide-ranging and rudimentary and that the scientists provided no material or specific plans. Moreover, the scientists probably were incapable of providing truly helpful information because their expertise was not in bomb design but in the processing of fissile material, which is almost certainly beyond the capacities of a nonstate group. Kalid Sheikh Mohammed, the apparent planner of the 9/11 attacks, reportedly says that al Qaeda’s bomb efforts never went beyond searching the Internet. After the fall of the Taliban in 2001, technical experts from the CIA and the Department of Energy examined documents and other information that were uncovered by intelligence agencies and the media in Afghanistan. They uncovered no credible information that al Qaeda had obtained fissile material or acquired a nuclear weapon. Moreover, they found no evidence of any radioactive material suitable for weapons. They did uncover, however, a “nuclear-related” document discussing “openly available concepts about the nuclear fuel cycle and some weapons-related issues.” Just a day or two before al Qaeda was to flee from Afghanistan in 2001, bin Laden supposedly told a Pakistani journalist, “If the United States uses chemical or nuclear weapons against us, we might respond with chemical and nuclear weapons. We possess these weapons as a deterrent.” Given the military pressure that they were then under and taking into account the evidence of the primitive or more probably nonexistent nature of al Qaeda’s nuclear program, the reported assertions, although unsettling, appear at best to be a desperate bluff. Bin Laden has made statements about nuclear weapons a few other times. Some of these pronouncements can be seen to be threatening, but they are rather coy and indirect, indicating perhaps something of an interest, but not acknowledging a capability. And as terrorism specialist Louise Richardson observes, “Statements claiming a right to possess nuclear weapons have been misinterpreted as expressing a determination to use them. This in turn has fed the exaggeration of the threat we face.” Norwegian researcher Anne Stenersen concluded after an exhaustive study of available materials that, although “it is likely that al Qaeda central has considered the option of using non-conventional weapons,” there is “little evidence that such ideas ever developed into actual plans, or that they were given any kind of priority at the expense of more traditional types of terrorist attacks.” She also notes that information on an al Qaeda computer left behind in Afghanistan in 2001 indicates that only $2,000 to $4,000 was earmarked for weapons of mass destruction research and that the money was mainly for very crude work on chemical weapons. Today, the key portions of al Qaeda central may well total only a few hundred people, apparently assisting the Taliban’s distinctly separate, far larger, and very troublesome insurgency in Afghanistan. Beyond this tiny band, there are thousands of sympathizers and would-be jihadists spread around the globe. They mainly connect in Internet chat rooms, engage in radicalizing conversations, and variously dare each other to actually do something. Any “threat,” particularly to the West, appears, then, principally to derive from self-selected people, often isolated from each other, who fantasize about performing dire deeds. From time to time some of these people, or ones closer to al Qaeda central, actually manage to do some harm. And occasionally, they may even be able to pull off something large, such as 9/11. But in most cases, their capacities and schemes, or alleged schemes, seem to be far less dangerous than initial press reports vividly, even hysterically, suggest. Most important for present purposes, however, is that any notion that al Qaeda has the capacity to acquire nuclear weapons, even if it wanted to, looks farfetched in the extreme. It is also noteworthy that, although there have been plenty of terrorist attacks in the world since 2001, all have relied on conventional destructive methods. For the most part, terrorists seem to be heeding the advice found in a memo on an al Qaeda laptop seized in Pakistan in 2004: “Make use of that which is available … rather than waste valuable time becoming despondent over that which is not within your reach.” In fact, history consistently demonstrates that terrorists prefer weapons that they know and understand, not new, exotic ones. Glenn Carle, a 23-year CIA veteran and once its deputy intelligence officer for transnational threats, warns, “We must not take fright at the specter our leaders have exaggerated. In fact, we must see jihadists for the small, lethal, disjointed, and miserable opponents that they are.” al Qaeda, he says, has only a handful of individuals capable of planning, organizing, and leading a terrorist organization, and although the group has threatened attacks with nuclear weapons, “its capabilities are far inferior to its desires.” Policy alternatives The purpose here has not been to argue that policies designed to inconvenience the atomic terrorist are necessarily unneeded or unwise. Rather, in contrast with the many who insist that atomic terrorism under current conditions is rather likely— indeed, exceedingly likely—to come about, I have contended that it is hugely unlikely. However, it is important to consider not only the likelihood that an event will take place, but also its consequences. Therefore, one must be concerned about catastrophic events even if their probability is small, and efforts to reduce that likelihood even further may well be justified. At some point, however, probabilities become so low that, even for catastrophic events, it may make sense to ignore them or at least put them on the back burner; in short, the risk becomes acceptable. For example, the British could at any time attack the United States with their submarine-launched missiles and kill millions of Americans, far more than even the most monumentally gifted and lucky terrorist group. Yet the risk that this potential calamity might take place evokes little concern; essentially it is an acceptable risk. Meanwhile, Russia, with whom the United States has a rather strained relationship, could at any time do vastly more damage with its nuclear weapons, a fully imaginable calamity that is substantially ignored. In constructing what he calls “a case for fear,” Cass Sunstein, a scholar and current Obama administration official, has pointed out that if there is a yearly probability of 1 in 100,000 that terrorists could launch a nuclear or massive biological attack, the risk would cumulate to 1 in 10,000 over 10 years and to 1 in 5,000 over 20. These odds, he suggests, are “not the most comforting.” Comfort, of course, lies in the viscera of those to be comforted, and, as he suggests, many would probably have difficulty settling down with odds like that. But there must be some point at which the concerns even of these people would ease. Just perhaps it is at one of the levels suggested above: one in a million or one in three billion per attempt.

#### No risk of prolif, no chain reaction, and it would be slow at worst – your evidence is alarmism

Gavin 10 (Francis, Tom Slick Professor of International Affairs and Director of the Robert S. Strauss Center for International Security and Law @ the Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs @ the University of Texas at Austin, “Sam As It Ever Was; Nuclear Alarmism, Proliferation, and the Cold War,” Lexis)

Fears of a tipping point were especially acute in the aftermath of China's 1964 detonation of an atomic bomb: it was predicted that India, Indonesia, and Japan might follow, with consequences worldwide, as "Israel, Sweden, Germany, and other potential nuclear countries far from China and India would be affected by proliferation in Asia." 40 A U.S. government document identified "at least eleven nations (India, Japan, Israel, Sweden, West Germany, Italy, Canada, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Rumania, and Yugoslavia)" with the capacity to go nuclear, a number that would soon "grow substantially" to include "South Africa, the United Arab Republic, Spain, Brazil and Mexico." 41 A top-secret, blue-ribbon committee established to craft the U.S. response contended that "the [1964] Chinese nuclear explosion has increased the urgency and complexity of this problem by creating strong pressures to develop independent nuclear forces, which, in turn, could strongly influence the plans of other potential nuclear powers." 42 These predictions were largely wrong. In 1985 the National Intelligence Council noted that for "almost thirty years the Intelligence Community has been writing about which nations might next get the bomb." All of these estimates based their largely pessimistic and ultimately incorrect estimates on factors such as the increased "access to fissile materials," improved technical capabilities in countries, the likelihood of "chain reactions," or a "scramble" to proliferation when "even one additional state demonstrates a nuclear capability." The 1985 report goes on, "The most striking characteristic of the present-day nuclear proliferation scene is that, despite the alarms rung by past Estimates, no additional overt proliferation of nuclear weapons has actually occurred since China tested its bomb in 1964." **Although "some proliferation** of nuclear explosive capabilities and other major proliferation-related developments **have taken place** in the past two decades," they did not have "the damaging, systemwide impacts that the Intelligence community generally anticipated they would." 43 In his analysis of more than sixty years of failed efforts to accurately predict nuclear proliferation, analyst Moeed Yusuf concludes that "the pace of proliferation has been **much slower** than anticipated by most." The majority of countries suspected of trying to obtain a nuclear weapons capability "never **even came close to crossing the threshold**. In fact, most did not even initiate a weapons program." If all the countries that were considered prime suspects over the past sixty years had developed nuclear weapons, "the world would have at least 19 nuclear powers today." 44 As Potter and Mukhatzhanova argue, government and academic experts frequently "exaggerated the scope and pace of nuclear weapons proliferation." 45 Nor is there compelling evidence that a nuclear proliferation chain reaction will ever occur. Rather, the **pool** of potential proliferators **has been shrinking**. Proliferation pressures were far greater during the Cold War. In the 1960s, at least twenty-one countries either had or were considering nuclear weapons research programs. Today only nine countries are known to have nuclear weapons. Belarus, Brazil, Kazakhstan, Libya, South Africa, Sweden, and Ukraine have dismantled their weapons programs. Even rogue states that are/were a great concern to U.S. policymakers--Iran, Iraq, Libya, and North Korea--began their nuclear weapons programs before the Cold War had ended. 46 As far as is known, no nation has started a new nuclear weapons program since the demise of the Soviet Union in 1991. 47 Ironically, by focusing on the threat of rogue states, policymakers may have underestimated the potentially far more destabilizing effect of proliferation in "respectable" states such as Germany, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan.

#### No impact – multiple checks prevent use

Cha 1 (Victor, Associate Professor of Government and School of Foreign Service @ Georgetown, “The second nuclear age: Proliferation pessimism versus sober optimism in South Asia and East Asia,” Journal of Strategic Studies, InformaWorld)

Proliferation pessimists do not deny the existence of the nuclear taboo; they do, nevertheless, see this taboo as shared only by First World proliferators. Is this a fair assessment? As Tannenwald argues, a taboo takes effect when the agent realizes (1) the exceptionalist nature of the weapon (i.e., in terms of its destructive power); (2) the absence of effective defenses (i.e., vulnerability); (3) and fears the political and social consequences of taking such an action. All of these conditions **readily hold for new** nuclear **powers**. Moreover, the revulsion against nuclear weapons use (first-use) has become so institutionalized in an array of international agreements and practices such that new NWS states operate in an environment that **severely circumscribes** the realm of legitimate **nuclear use**.90 Proliferation pessimists therefore underestimate the transformative effects of nuclear weapons on these new proliferators. They assume that the interests for aspiring nuclear powers remain constant in the pre- and post-acquisition phases. They do not consider that **once states *cross* the** nuclear **threshold, they become** acutely awareof the dangers and responsibilities that come with these new awesome capabilities. The likelihood of such a learning process occurring is even higher if nuclear weapons are valued for their political currency. As noted above, while security needs certainly drive proliferation in Asia, a predominant factor that cannot be disentangled from this dynamic is the striving for prestige and international recognition as an NWS state. Moreover, if the taboo equates the use of nuclear weapons with an 'uncivilized' or 'barbarian' state," then those states that are status-conscious will be that much more attuned to the taboo. The effects of the taboo on Asian proliferators are therefore both regulative and constitutive. In the former sense, as these states further embed themselves in the international community (discussed below), this change heightens the costs of breaking any rules regarding nuclear use. The taboo's constitutive effects also are evident in that any use would **undermine** one of **the primary purposes** for which the capabilities were sought (e.g., prestige, badge of modernity). Although it is still relatively early in the game, there is some evidence that the acquisition of nuclear capabilities has been accompanied by a change in preferences about what is acceptable behavior. While India has rejected any notions that it might roll back its newfound capability, it had readily admitted that as an incipient nuclear weapons state, it now has certain responsibilities that include a no-first-use policy and not sharing nuclear weapons technology with other irresponsible states.92 Similarly, Pakistan previously placed little value and even resented nonproliferation norms as these were seen as inhibiting and degrading to the national character.93 Otherwise, they might have been swayed by the benefits of not responding to the Indian tests as a shining example of a country adhering to nuclear nonproliferation norms. Arguably it is only after becoming an incipient nuclear weapons state that such arguments about nonproliferation gain value. Nowhere is this perverse dynamic more evident than in both sides' views of the CTBT. Previously perceived as an instrument intended to preempt nuclear spread beyond the first age, the CTBT is now arguably seen by India and Pakistan in less antagonistic terms, and even among some, as a responsibility to be borne as a nuclear state.

#### No extinction from disease

Malcolm Gladwell 95, writer for The New Yorker and best-selling author The New Republic, July 17 and 24, 1995, excerpted in Epidemics: Opposing Viewpoints, 1999, p. 31-32

Every infectious agent that has ever plagued humanity has had to adapt a specific strategy but every strategy carries a corresponding cost and this makes human counterattack possible. Malaria is vicious and deadly but it relies on mosquitoes to spread from one human to the next, which means that draining swamps and putting up mosquito netting can all hut halt endemic malaria. Smallpox is extraordinarily durable remaining infectious in the environment for years, but its very durability its essential rigidity is what makes it one of the easiest microbes to create a vaccine against. AIDS is almost invariably lethal because it attacks the body at its point of great vulnerability, that is, the immune system, but the fact that it targets blood cells is what makes it so relatively uninfectious. Viruses are not superhuman. I could go on, but the point is obvious. Any microbe capable of wiping us all out would have to be everything at once: as contagious as flue, as durable as the cold, as lethal as Ebola, as stealthy as HIV and so doggedly resistant to mutation that it would stay deadly over the course of a long epidemic. But viruses are not, well, superhuman. They cannot do everything at once. It is one of the ironies of the analysis of alarmists such as Preston that they are all too willing to point out the limitations of human beings, but they neglect to point out the limitations of microscopic life forms.

#### Burn out

Joshua Lederberg, professor of genetics at Stanford University School of Medicine, 1999, Epidemic: The World of Infectious Disease, p. 13

The toll of the fourteenth-century plague, the "Black Death," was closer to one third. If the bugs' potential to develop adaptations that could kill us off were the whole story, we would not be here. However, with very rare exceptions, our microbial adversaries have a shared interest in our survival. Almost any pathogen comes to a dead end when we die; it first has to communicate itself to another host in order to survive. So historically, the really severe host- pathogen interactions have resulted in a wipeout of both host and pathogen. We humans are still here because, so far, the pathogens that have attacked us have willy-nilly had an interest in our survival. This is a very delicate balance, and it is easily disturbed, often in the wake of large-scale ecological upsets.

#### This advantage died with the Tea Party in the Presidential election – nearly all of Emory’s cards are years old alarmism or from early 2012 and in the context of Obama’s election strategies

#### The Tea Party is over

Friedman 1-22

Brad, 'Tea Party' Brand Now a Liability to 'Tea Party' ... and Republicans

American blogger, journalist, actor, radio broadcaster, director and software programmer, most known for his criticism of election integrity issues in the USA, http://www.bradblog.com/?p=9827#more-9827

But it's little wonder these folks are running from the name. Their popularity, and their name brand, is now plummeting along with the fortunes of the Congressional Republican Party. As Bennet notes, even Rightwing pollsters like Rasmussen are finding that support for the "Tea Party" movement is absolutely cratering... Rasmussen, a favorite polling firm of conservatives, found in a survey this month that only 8 percent of voters identify themselves as tea party members, down from a high of 24 percent shortly after passage of the federal health care law in 2010. The Rasmussen poll found 30 percent of voters had a favorable view of the tea party and 49 percent had a negative view. ... An October Rasmussen poll found 44 percent of voters considered “tea party” a negative label, eclipsing “liberal” as the most potent negative adjective. And, again, he's the Republican pollster. NBC News/Wall Street Journal finds, according to Benen, that attitudes about the "Tea Party" are "abysmal". "Just 9% have a 'very positive' impression of the so-called movement --- an all-time low," he writes, "while 32% have a 'very negative' impression --- an all-time high. All told, the Tea Party's favorability rating is down to just 23%, which is even lower than the GOP's support and that of the NRA." "If the 'movement' still exists," Benen argues, "it's gasping for air --- and relevance." But the problems for the Republican Party itself are much deeper than simply their association with the tainted "Tea Party". Benen explains, for example, that "After discovering that there aren't any Republicans left in the center," the Republican Main Street Partnership, a D.C. outfit promoting moderate GOP lawmakers and policies, "dropped the 'R' word and became simply the Main Street Partnership."

#### Politics links turn this advantage – even if they win their GOP turns, Democrat fracturing ensures worse gridlock for progressivism.

#### Economic impact is minimal and temporary – each turbine field only requires 1 or 2 permanent workers

Rosenbloom 6 (Eric, Writer and Science Editor for Wind Watch Online, “A Problem With Wind Power”)

Despite the energy industry’s claim that wind farms create jobs (“revitalize struggling rural communities,” says Enxco), the fact is that, after the few months of construction—much of it handled by imported labor from A Problem With Wind Power — page 5the turbine company—a typical large wind facility requires just one maintenance worker. Of the 200 workers involved in construction of the 89-turbine Top of Iowa facility, only 20 were local; seven permanent jobs were created. 16 The average nationwide is 1–2 jobs per 20 MW installed capacity.

#### Emory can’t access their Friedman impact evidence about gridlock – it assumes a national mindset shift and a collapse of the BIG OIL which the plan doesn’t affect

#### The coal lobby blocks solvency

**Elk 09** - Union organizer and labor journalist who writes for Harper's Magazine, the American Prospect, the Huffington Post and In These Times. He has appeared as a commentator on CNN, Fox News, and NPR. [[Mike Elk](http://www.ourfuture.org/users/new-4013), “Stop The Teabaggers, Give Them Green Jobs: Lessons From the Coalfields of West Virginia,” Campaign for America’s Future, August 27, 2009 - 4:40pm ET, pg. http://tinyurl.com/mq62jx

Clearly, West Virginians would prefer jobs that didn't destroy their communities and health, but are forced into coal mining because few other jobs exist. As a result, West Virginians desperately fear losing these jobs. The fossil fuel lobby exploits this fear to kill investments in clean energy jobs. The industry uses events like the upcoming free concert called ["Friends of America"](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/dave-cooper/rocker-ted-nugent-to-emce_b_258696.html) hosted by Sean Hannity, which has press materials implicitly attacking clean energy legislation, hysterically warning, [“we must keep these [coal mining] jobs from being regulated out of existence](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/dave-cooper/rocker-ted-nugent-to-emce_b_258696.html)”. These industries always say that regulating them will cost jobs - even when it is proven that jobs will be created. This is because they have created a situation where people are hanging on by a thread, paid so little that they desperately cling to what they have and other people are starving in front of them. The ability of these AstroTurf groups to mobilize people fearing the loss of their jobs led to the dramatic weakening of the Waxman-Markey climate bill and quite possibly health care. We often make fun of teabaggers showing up at town halls, but fail to realize that the reason they are motivated to rebel against change because all change has ever meant to them is job loss and the destruction of their communities.

#### Appalachia wind cant solve the national debt which is Lieberthal & O'Hanlon’s internal link to war

#### Their political transition evidence is terrible – no warrant for why Appalachia is key or why it would spur a national mindset shift – its 3 years old and doesn’t assume other massive federal investments in renewable energy – AND they only do 1 of the 5 recommendations in the article (read Green, Emory’s is yellow)

**Bailey 10** – Research and Policy Director @ Mountain Association for Community Economic Development [[Jason Bailey](http://www.thesolutionsjournal.com/user/4907), “Start Appalachian Transition through Green Jobs Investments,” Solutions Journal, Volume 1 | Issue 4 | Aug 2010, pg. http://tinyurl.com/9gxb8bm

Most communities around the world aren’t yet aware of how climate change will drastically impact their land, economy, and way of life. But the downsides of a fossil fuel–based economy are already well known in the coalfields of central Appalachia, a region including southern West Virginia, eastern Kentucky, southwest Virginia, and east Tennessee. Central Appalachia’s coal economy has severely altered the landscape and created communities made up of "haves and have-nots."1 But by creating jobs in ways that improve the land, air, and water, a green jobs strategy can set a new course for a needed economic transition. Coal mining currently employs around 38,000 people in central Appalachia, and miners make good salaries. But due largely to mechanization, those jobs now make up only about 10 percent of employment in the coal counties, which suffer from high and persistent poverty.2 Most of the benefits of coal extraction have bypassed the region. While more than 20 billion tons of coal have been mined in central Appalachia over the last 100 years, the region contains 23 of the poorest 100 counties in the country, measured by median household income.3,4,5 There has been too little economic diversification beyond retail and social services in central Appalachia, and unemployed and discouraged workers make up a significant share of the working-age population.2 Decreasing coal reserves, the rising competitiveness of energy alternatives, and needed environmental and health restrictions will mean continued decline in central Appalachian coal production and employment over the next few decades.6,7 Green jobs are critical in central Appalachia for a number of reasons. First, an economy based on a different relationship to the land and to energy is essential to avoid the destruction from abusive mining practices that, if allowed to continue, would limit any long-term possibilities. Second, the region’s ancient mountains and diverse forests are among its main assets, and they present numerous income-generating opportunities that do not compromise the integrity of the land. And third, addressing the region’s existing environmental degradation presents immediate green job opportunities. That work is huge and labor intensive, and requires some of the skills and experience of the region’s existing workforce, including those who have worked in coal. Public investment could advance a green jobs strategy, and the region’s transition could start today in five overlapping green jobs areas: 1. Increase Energy Efficiency in Homes, Buildings, and Businesses Central Appalachia has high energy usage, related to a historic neglect of energy efficiency. Kentucky’s residential sector, for example, uses 24 percent more energy on average than the nation, and a recent Appalachian Regional Commission (ARC) report projected that energy usage in Appalachia will grow at a rate 50 percent higher than the national rate between now and 2030.8,9 High energy usage and inattention to energy efficiency have been fed by low electricity prices from coal-fired power. But those prices are rising dramatically (up 40 percent in Kentucky in the last five years alone) and will increase further in future years. High energy usage has a lot to do with substandard housing and lack of investment in the existing building infrastructure. More than 100,000 families in central Appalachia lack access to quality housing. Central Appalachian homes are three to four times more likely to be substandard in comparison to homes elsewhere in the nation. Approximately 25 percent of the housing stock consists of manufactured homes, most of which are highly inefficient, a share that rises to 40 percent in some counties. A number of regional efforts are emerging to deal with these challenges, and they could be accelerated through greater federal financial support. Frontier Housing, a regional nonprofit, has developed a program to replace the estimated 300,000 highly inefficient mobile homes built before the 1976 HUD mobile home code with ENERGY STAR homes. The Mountain Association for Community Economic Development (MACED) is working with a number of rural electric co-ops in eastern Kentucky to create a pilot on-bill financing program for energy efficiency improvements that would be open to residents, commercial businesses, and institutions. And the Federation of Appalachian Housing Enterprises is working to double the number of highly energy efficient green homes built for low-income families through its member organizations. An ARC report found that a set of modeled energy efficiency policies in the region would save Appalachian consumers almost $10 billion annually on their energy bills by 2020 and create over 37,000 jobs. 2. Expand Local Renewable Energy Production Central Appalachia’s historic reliance on coal has also meant little progress in diversifying into renewable energy sources. However, the region possesses real renewable energy potential. Wind power is possible at distributed and at utility scale, particularly on ridgetops in central Appalachia. With the higher hub heights of modern wind turbines, West Virginia has at least 2,772 megawatts (MW) of wind potential, and the best wind potential in Kentucky is in the counties in the southeastern coalfields.10,11 Community-scale energy from woody biomass is also a significant opportunity. The ARC estimates the total annual biomass resources for the Appalachian states at over 108 million tons.12 Solar potential exists in central Appalachia, particularly for distributed applications of solar thermal and solar photovoltaic (PV). Small, low-power hydro and micro-hydro are also an opportunity; the Idaho National Laboratory has estimated 518 MW of potential in Kentucky and 484 MW in West Virginia.13 Local efforts to develop renewable energy are emerging. Leaders of Kentuckians For The Commonwealth in the former company towns of Benham and Lynch have launched a local initiative to address the need for renewable energy and energy efficiency in the area. The nearby mountains have the greatest wind potential in all of Kentucky, and the rate of residential electricity usage in Benham is one of the highest in the state, in part due to poorly insulated housing stock.14 In southern West Virginia, the leaders of Coal River Wind developed a model and a proposal for a 328-MW wind farm on Coal River Mountain as an alternative to mountaintop removal mining in the same location.15 An economic impact analysis suggests that the wind farm would create more long-term jobs and have a greater economic impact than coal mining—particularly if local production of turbine components could be incorporated.16 Federal investment could support existing efforts and create new models. The USDA's Rural Utilities Service financing for renewable energy production and energy efficiency efforts could assist regional electric utilities in beginning to transition. Setting aside funds for central Appalachia through such sources as the USDA Rural Energy for America Program and the Department of Energy (DOE) Energy Efficiency and Conservation Block Grant could support local planning and establish needed demonstrations of community-scale renewable energy projects. 3. Increase Sustainable Management of Forestland and Build a Sustainable Forest Economy About 70 percent of the land in central Appalachia is forested, and the region possesses a diverse hardwood forest mix. But the forests have suffered from high-grading—the removal of only high quality trees, which degrades forest quality—and the prevalence of predatory or irresponsible logging practices. Over 90 percent of the forestland is privately owned, most often by families who have small tracts or by absentee landholding companies. There are few incentives or resources for private landowners to pursue sustainable forestland management and few opportunities for local communities to have a say in the use of forestland owned by outside corporate interests. In this same context, the market for wood products is shifting to sustainably certified wood, a practice supported by government procurement policies. Many of the region’s existing wood processors are obtaining chain-of-custody certification to access these markets, but they lack a local supply of certified wood; in Kentucky, for example, only about 1,000 acres are certified by the Forest Stewardship Council. Other markets for the region’s forests either exist or are emerging, including ecosystem services (for which MACED is now operating a program to broker the sale of working forest carbon credits), woody biomass for energy, and non-timber forest products. Federal assistance could help establish a certification support center that would help small landowners and wood-products businesses obtain certification. A wood-products competitiveness corporation could help primary and secondary manufacturers grow, modernize, and cooperate. Expanded support for management planning and cost-share programs could increase private forestland management and fill the gap left by federal government budget cuts. To make woody biomass a sustainable opportunity would require more research in order to create harvesting guidelines, understand the relationship between biomass supply and potential demand, and identify which technologies are most beneficial economically and ecologically. And a land bank for community financing and purchase of pre- and post-mine land for sustainable forestry activities could expand local control of land currently owned by outside interests. 4. Support Expansion of a Sustainable Local Foods System The growing demand for local, healthy, and sustainably produced foods in the region’s urban fringe is juxtaposed with a fairly widespread lack of access to good foods (due to distance, income, and market hurdles), especially for lower income people. Health problems linked to poor diet are a major issue in the region, and efforts to increase access to good local food are a critical part of the solution. In addition, there is significant economic and job creation potential in the food and farming sector. Economist Ken Meter found in 2007 that $2.2 billion in annual income could be created for farmers in Virginia if all of the state’s residents bought local farm products just one day a week. A number of important models exist in the region. About 60 farmers participate in Appalachian Harvest, a program of Appalachian Sustainable Development (ASD) based in southwest Virginia. Appalachian Harvest farmers grow organic produce and free-range eggs, which ASD then sorts in a packinghouse and sells to about 600 supermarkets and other institutions at a premium under its Appalachian Harvest brand. The Appalachian Center for Economic Networks (ACENet) in Appalachian Ohio has created a commercial kitchen and thermal processing facility for local food entrepreneurs to develop value-added products with the assistance of a food scientist and a business counselor. The Jubilee Project in northeast Tennessee operates a community kitchen, manages a co-op of 30 local farmers, and is accessing markets in the local school system. Other organizations, like Rural Action, are demonstrating success with farmers’ markets and produce auctions. Federal investment could build upon these local efforts by, for example, creating a grants pool administered by ARC and USDA that would expand these initiatives and launch new ones. Other new USDA financing and assistance efforts supportive of local food enterprises and initiatives could include set-asides for central Appalachia, such as the Rural Microentrepreneur Assistance Program. 5. Invest in Environmental Remediation and Restoration of Land[ Communities in central Appalachia face serious challenges: how to remediate surface-mined land and how to deal with the impacts of acid mine drainage, slurry ponds, and other mine-related issues. While proper remediation methods can never restore land to its pre-mining condition and should not be an excuse for allowing continued destructive practices, there is a need for strategies to address the damage that has already been done. While the 1977 Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act (SMCRA) sought to address the reclamation of land that was mined both before and after passage of the act, numerous problems with the design and implementation of the law have meant inadequate progress. Problems with current reclamation laws include the historic use of poor reclamation methods that create little or no regeneration; the failure to pay out the full funds in the Abandoned Mine Land (AML) fund and the continuing appropriation of AML monies to western states with no abandoned mine lands left; the lack of a federal commitment to fully address all of the region’s remediation and restoration challenges; and the lack of community visioning and planning processes for what could be done with formerly mined sites. The federal government should direct more resources to environmental remediation in central Appalachia by changing the formulas in the AML and other programs. It should increase support for innovative and improved efforts at reclamation, including the Appalachian Regional Reforestation Initiative and local efforts like those of East Kentucky Biodiesel, which has plans for “ecological remediation plantations” on formerly mined land that use native species to produce high efficiency bioenergy for local use. Decisions about the best use of these lands should be driven by citizen involvement and local planning. What’s at Stake Twenty or thirty years from now, central Appalachia will be a different place than it is today. In one scenario, the land will be decimated by increasingly radical mining practices used to haul out the last tons of coal in the cheapest way possible, leaving the region’s communities further depopulated and demoralized. In a second scenario, it will be a region in the midst of transition. There will be a greater sense of hope, new local businesses and projects forming, more democratic public decision making, and a land that is beginning to heal. Which scenario plays out has implications not just for central Appalachia, but for the rest of the country and beyond. The powerful corporations that are influencing climate, energy, and other policies in this country derive their wealth and political power from places like central Appalachia. Federal investment now in green jobs can start us on the course of transition, and transition here can help make bigger transitions possible elsewhere.

### solvency

#### All of the aff authors are vested actors and state groups with huge biases to inflate the importance of Appalachia to get federal funds. Be skeptical of their grand transition and modeling claims.

#### Zeller says two NASA scientists we’re working to TRY to make Appalachia the test case. Not that it IS the test case. And he concludes the coal industry takes out solvency – land control

**Zeller 10** [[TOM ZELLER Jr.](http://topics.nytimes.com/topics/reference/timestopics/people/z/tom_jr_zeller/index.html?inline=nyt-per) “A Battle in Mining Country Pits Coal Against Wind,” New York Times, Published: August 14, 2010, pg. http://tinyurl.com/8ctubyz

At least one study has shown that a wind project could be a feasible alternative to coal mining here, although the coal industry’s control over the land and the uncertain and often tenuous financial prospects of wind generation appear to make it unlikely to be pursued.

#### The Biggers evidence is only about Kentucky and not about the AFF – it’s also normative and not predictive -

#### This is Emory’s first solvency card – re-highlighted to illustrate MACED’s mandate of funding - special category alone won’t solve ((read green highlighting -- yellow is emory)

**MACED 10** [Mountain Association for Community Economic Development, “Economic Transition in Central Appalachia: Ideas for the Appalachian Regional Development Initiative” April 8, 2010

Recommendations: Provide grant funding and financing for community-scale renewable energy demonstrations in the areas of wind, solar, low-impact woody biomass and low impact hydro. Community-scale renewable energy production that is locally owned has the potential to maximize the economic benefits of energy production for local communities. In addition, community-scale projects can be high-efficiency, reusing waste heat in the case of biomass projects and minimizing line loss. A program to create local demonstrations across the region, including at public buildings and institutions like hospitals, in small town main street areas, and at a county scale could go a long way in leveraging new beneficial energy activity. A proposal from East Kentucky Biodiesel to create a pilot pyrolysis/gasification facility utilizing biomass grown on former surface mine land, explained on page 19, has the potential to be the first stage of a regional network of community-scale bioenergy production. A wide range of USDA and DOE programs promoting renewable energy and energy efficiency projects could be set aside or repurposed for efforts of this kind. Expand USDA Rural Utility Service (RUS) financing for renewable energy production (and energy efficiency) to utilities located in Central Appalachia. President Obama’s 2011 budget proposes additional funds to USDA “to help transition fossil fuel-dependent utilities to renewable energy.”18 Central Appalachian utilities are among the most fossil fuel dependent in the country, reliant on coal in aging power plants for well over 90 percent of their electricity. A 2009 study by the Ochs Center for Metropolitan Studies showed that East Kentucky Power Cooperative, a major provider of electricity in the Appalachian Kentucky, could create 8,750 jobs and inject $1.7 billion into the regional economy through a program of energy efficiency investments and expanded renewable energy capacity.19 A combination of grants and loans through RUS (and similar USDA programs like REDLG) to Central Appalachian utilities could help them begin to make this transition and create new jobs and economic opportunities in the process. One potential step forward in this direction is the new Rural Energy Savings Program legislation filed by in the House by Rep. James Clyburn and in the Senate by Sen. Jeff Merkley.20 It would create a pool of RUS funds for rural electric coops to create on-bill financing programs. Create a special category and set-aside of USDA Rural Energy for America (REAP) grants and guaranteed loans for renewable energy **and energy efficiency** projects in Central Appalachia. The USDA REAP program provides valuable, much needed funds for small businesses, farmers and others to pursue renewable energy projects and energy efficiency improvements. Even with expanded funding for this program, however, valuable projects including ones MACED has helped support are being denied funding. Those projects that are receiving REAP grants are creating important models in the region. Organizations like MACED and the Natural Capital Investment Fund in West Virginia can also provide financing to small businesses that can be packaged with REAP grants, which will help leverage federal dollars and increase impact. Fund community-based wind monitoring efforts to help communities assess the feasibility of wind power. Wind power along the ridgelines of Central Appalachia is widely recognized as an important regional opportunity. However, there is a lack of site-specific data for communities to understand the actual opportunities for wind development in the region, holding back project development. A program of grants and equipment loans could help communities better assess these opportunities. Support the establishment of renewable energy component manufacturing in the coalfields of Central Appalachia. Manufacturing of component parts for the wind and solar supply chain offer some of the greatest economic opportunities for the nation as a whole. However, the lack of manufacturing infrastructure in the heart of Central Appalachia threatens to leave the region out of these opportunities. An initiative should be developed with the goal of establishing at least one significant supply chain manufacturer in the coalfields of Central Appalachia. This initiative should include research to identify if there are any opportunities with existing manufacturers in the region. If no such opportunities arise, the focus should be on the feasibility of establishing a new facility. New approaches like the Cleveland model of community-based, worker-owned companies in new green industries are promising ways to create jobs that help low-income workers accrue long-term wealth.21 A project to establish a model facility in a coalfield community could go a long way in creating good opportunities and promoting a needed discussion about the region’s energy future. Provide competitive grants for school-based renewable energy projects eligible for schools in Central Appalachia. A number of potential models exist for renewable energy production at the school level, which can save schools money and create important opportunities for student and community learning. The model of Russell High School in Greenup County, Kentucky, is one example of the use of wind and solar demonstrations to save money and provide training for vocational students. Opportunities also exist to fund fuels-for-schools initiatives (like those in the western U. S.) utilizing local, sustainably harvested woody biomass as a building heat source. Support workforce training and enterprise development in the new renewable energy industries. MACED and other entrepreneurial development organizations like the Natural Capital Investment Fund have worked with a number of entrepreneurs in the region interested in starting new companies in wind, biomass, or solar. These folks lack access to training that would deepen their understanding of the technologies, and often lack the business management skills to make their fledgling enterprises survive. In Kentucky, for example, state tax credits were recently enacted for renewable energy installations like solar panels, but included requirements that installers be North American Board of Certified Energy Practitioner (NABCEP) certified. Only a handful of people in tfhe entirestate have that certification. Federal workforce and business services dollars could support targeted scholarship, training, and technical assistance programs that could help more renewable energy businesses get off the ground. As mentioned in the energy efficiency section above, the Department of Labor green jobs training programs such as the Green Capacity Building program, Energy Training Partnerships, and Pathways out of Poverty program could be allocated for such investments. Pg. 8-11

#### Heres the part of the article after Emory’s card ends

#### And concludes we need investment in forestry to solve sustainability

**MACED 10** [Mountain Association for Community Economic Development, “Economic Transition in Central Appalachia: Ideas for the Appalachian Regional Development Initiative” April 8, 2010

Increase sustainable management of forestland and build a sustainable forestry economy Appalachia’s forests are among the most ecologically diverse in the world.22 The Natural Resources Defense Council has named the Cumberland Plateau in Central Appalachia one of thirteen of the world’s Biogems.23 The region’s forests are the origin of water for a large portion of the eastern United States as well as an important source of clean air and the sequestration of carbon. Tremendously beautiful, they are also a source of pride for residents and an attraction for visitors. However, the region’s forests have not been properly managed to maximize their ecological and economic benefits to the residents of the region and beyond. Over 100 years ago, the Appalachian forests were almost completely logged to provide lumber for a growing economy. Now, the region’s forests have grown back but poor management practices threaten their future. The forests suffer from high-grading—the removal of high quality trees to the degradation of forest quality—and the prevalence of predatory or irresponsible logging practices. As climate change increases, the lack of ecological resiliency will make these forests more susceptible to damage from wildfire, pests, ice storms and other weather events.

#### He also says we need stewardship management planning – aff doesn’t do that

**MACED 10** [Mountain Association for Community Economic Development, “Economic Transition in Central Appalachia: Ideas for the Appalachian Regional Development Initiative” April 8, 2010

Provide resources to Central Appalachian states to expand the technical assistance resources available to help landowners with stewardship planning. Developing management plans is the first step towards sustainable forestland management. While states offer free assistance to forestland owners in developing stewardship plans, budget cuts have led to long waiting lists. The federal Forest Stewardship program, which operates through the states, has been inadequately funded 14 | P a g e through the years. Additional resources targeted to the Central Appalachian states could help address the backlog and increase the amount of forestland under a management plan.

#### And right before Emory’s card starts: need poverty-targeting and housing partnerships

**MACED 10** [Mountain Association for Community Economic Development, “Economic Transition in Central Appalachia: Ideas for the Appalachian Regional Development Initiative” April 8, 2010

2. Design ways to ensure that investments reach low-income people and communities. Like many high poverty areas, challenging local politics can sometimes make it difficult for outside investments to be most effective in reaching and impacting low-income people and communities. This is an important lesson of numerous past development efforts in the region. The administration should work to design mechanisms that promote broad community participation in planning and decision-making, and should be creative about targeting resources to a variety of entities including non-profits, community-based organizations, and non-traditional institutions where possible or appropriate. The recent announcement of a USDA partnership with the Federation of Appalachian Housing Enterprises for the administration of $25 million in Section 502 housing funds is an excellent example of this kind of non-traditional funding approach. 3. Promote initiatives that build community, leadership and entrepreneurial capacity. The administration should see itself as a partner with Appalachian communities and people in creating a new and better economy in the region. Using that approach, investments should not simply provide needed services and create jobs, but should be designed in ways that empower local people and organizations to take on new leadership roles and leave lasting business and institutional infrastructure in the region beyond the time in which monies run out. An approach that puts the building of human and social capital at the center will result in better outcomes for the region in the long-term.

#### Maced also demands government training, private partnerships, and other programs the Aff doesn’t implement

**MACED 10** [Mountain Association for Community Economic Development, “Economic Transition in Central Appalachia: Ideas for the Appalachian Regional Development Initiative” April 8, 2010

Train local governments and support local public sector energy efficiency improvements through expansion of the Penn State University model. Dr. Amy Glasmeier (now at MIT) and others at Penn State University have worked with Local Development Districts in Pennsylvania and through the Appalachian Regional Commission to develop a program that provides training and tools to local government officials to help them in assessing, planning and developing municipal-level projects that improve energy efficiency. The program targets water and wastewater treatment, lighting, utility bill and building assessment, and other strategies. Such a program could be expanded to include more local governments in the Central Appalachian region. Provide training for local people in the skills of energy efficiency improvements. The programs described above would ramp up the demand for energy improvement contractors and workers. There is danger that such programs would simply draw workers and contractors from adjacent, more urbanized areas unless intentional efforts are made to recruit and train a Central Appalachian workforce. A Central Appalachian enterprise and workforce development strategy aimed at developing “green contractors” could go a long way in providing needed new jobs in the region. There are a number of emerging potential partners in such an effort. A $3.8 million DOL grant to Mountain Empire Community College in southwest Virginia, in cooperation with MDC, is supporting a green jobs training model linked to obtaining a GED and college credit.7 The new Alliance for Sustainability, led by workforce policy expert Regional Technology Strategies (RTS), is organizing regional community colleges to explore increased training in green industries. Kentucky recently became licensed to provide the Building Performance Institute certification through its community colleges for energy auditors and contractors. Unions like the Laborers International (LiUNA) and the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (IBEW) are potential partners. Also, the Citizens Conservation Corps of West Virginia has been developing training programs for weatherization workers. These and other efforts could be expanded and accelerated through federal workforce development dollars, such as through DOL’s Energy Training Partnerships, Green Capacity Building and Pathways out of Poverty programs.

# 2nc

## da

### turns case

#### Neodymium shortage TURNS THE CASE – cant deploy clean energy without it

North American Wind Power 11 (News Department, December 27th 2011, “DOE: Rare-Earth Supply May Threaten Wind Turbine Production”)

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) has released the [2011 Critical Materials Strategy](http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/DOE_CMS_2011.pdf) - a report that examines the role that rare-earth metals and other key materials play in clean energy technologies such as wind turbines. According to the report, several clean energy technologies use materials that are at risk of supply disruptions in the short term, with risks generally decreasing in the medium and long terms. Supply challenges for five rare-earth metals - dysprosium, neodymium, terbium, europium and yttrium - may affect clean energy technology deployment in the years ahead, the DOE says. This is the DOE's second report on this topic and provides an update to last year's analysis. Using a methodology adapted from the National Academy of Sciences, the report includes criticality assessments for 16 elements based on their importance to clean energy and supply risk. The DOE’s critical materials research and development (R&D) plan is aligned with the three pillars of the DOE strategy: diversifying supply, developing substitutes and improving recycling.

sus development – nuclear winter, prevents wind, etc.

tea party – hard right fill in – military 1st

iran – draw in, triggers terminal impact

protectionism – global market fear

liberal internationalism – wrecks u.s. cred and multilat

terror - opportunity

prolif – wrecks gloal taboo against nukes

disease – state collapse, no response mechanism to new diseases

### Impact – China – Ext. Conflict

#### Neodysium will cause a conflict between the US and China – shapes relations and geopolitical landscape of Asia

Leithead 11 (Alastair, “Rare Earth Elements May Affect Future Global Relations”) http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-14114107

Wars have been fought over oil and water. But are the future global tensions going to be over access to Scandium, Neodymium or Dysprosium? Or could conflicts be fought over any other of the 17 rare earth elements, which, week by week, are becoming more and more important in developing the latest high-tech products? Tucked onto the periodic table of the elements, in a little section once ignored by chemistry teachers, rare earths are now everywhere. They are in your iPod or tablet computer, are vital for the red colour in your TV screen whatever make you have and allow your headphones to be small enough to fit into your ears. Continue reading the main story “ Start Quote As China's exports are being restricted, we are looking at outright shortages of rare earths, probably this year and next” Jim Sims Molycorp representative They are in hybrid cars - both in the batteries and the fuel - and in new generation wind turbines, missile defence systems, solar panels and even F-16 fighter jets. At the moment China provides 97% of the world's rare earth elements, which is making America nervous from both an economic and a security perspective. Their price has gone up 1000% in just a year, which is making mining them in the US worthwhile once again. 'Rare earth shortages' A deep hole in the ground high up in the Mojave Desert is America's only rare earths mine, and the race is on to dig out the supply to match the demand as only a few places in the world have enough reserves to make mining them practical. "The world - America, Britain, everyone - relies on what China exports to meet their needs," says Jim Sims from Molycorp, the company running California's Mountain Pass mine. "As China's exports are being restricted, we are looking at outright shortages of rare earths, probably this year and next," he adds. America's only rare earths mine is located in the Mojave Desert in the US south-west So the huge diggers and trucks moving vast volumes of rocks around, the daily explosive charges blasting the mountainside apart, are harvesting one of the world's biggest deposits. The mine closed down 10 years ago when a flood of cheap Chinese rare earth elements made profits hard to maintain. Until just a few weeks ago, Molycorp was asking for the US government's help to cover costs of digging these elements out, separating them off and moulding them into metal alloys. But the price has gone up so rapidly, rare earths is suddenly looking like a good business. Last year China's exports of rare earth elements to Japan were interrupted during a political row over territorial waters, which sent shudders around the world. "We should be worried when any country completely dominates any raw material supplies," says Christine Parthemore, from the Center for New American Security in Washington DC. "I don't think China is uniquely at fault in this situation, but they are using the political leverage that's derived from cornering the market they have as any country would. "I'm sure America would do the same," he adds. Increasing demand The creation of permanent magnets, a key component in so many green technologies, is one of the key uses of rare earths. They make the new generation of wind turbines more efficient and reliable. But there are such an increasing variety of uses for these elements, down to glass polishing, that there aren't enough of the raw materials to go around. The speed of China's growth means the country is consuming more of its own rare earths, which has led to a drop in the amount available for export. "It is a security issue strictly in the sense that these minerals are used in critical military components for their properties, which we don't currently have substitutes for," says Christine Parthemore. "If the prices go way up or there are actual supply shortages, it can drive prices up over the long term on military procurement - or it can mean there are parts that we can't manufacture here in the United States anymore." It increases the need for an industry to extract the ore and process the materials. "The elements are all mixed together in the ore we mine," Jim Sims says. "We turn them into a liquid, and let these elements settle out into oxides which are like powders," he adds. Inside a warehouse at the mine are dozens of huge white sacks, each weighing a metric tonne and each worth $200,000 (£125,700). "Those powders then get turned into metals as magnets or used in their oxide forms for a variety of uses in a variety of different substances," Mr Sims says. As new uses are found for materials like rare earth elements, there will be more competition, and access to them may change the shape of global politics.

### UQ – AT: New Supplies

#### No new supply influx for rare-earth metals – no mines will be ready soon enough

Adams 10 (Mike, Editor of Natural News Online, “Global Supply of Rare Earth Elements Could be Wiped out by 2012”)

China isn't the only geographic region where these rare earth elements are found, but constructing mines to pull these elements out of the ground takes many years. Some mines are under construction right now in other countries that could help fill the demand for REEs, but making them operational is "five to ten years away," says Lifton. That means these other mines won't really be operational until 2015 - 2020. Meanwhile, China could cut off its supply in 2012. That leaves a 3-7 year gap in which these rare earth elements will be in disastrously short supply. This brings up a couple of very important realizations related to investments:

### wind low

#### No increase in wind

**Jackson, 12/29/12** (Derrick, “Wistful hopes for US offshore wind energy”, http://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2012/12/29/wistful-hopes-for-offshore-wind-energy/npbaIxVU4sAcnKSlnd3QRP/story.html)

DESPITE ITS promise, the American wind industry is caught in the crosswinds of American politics — and that uncertain situation set up a surreal contrast when wind enterprises gathered here to tout their technologies. The American Wind Energy Association’s conference exhibition hall was full of European and multinational firms that are busy plunging scores of turbines into their waters. German developers talked about how the industry has transformed rusting homeland harbors into bustling ports, while British officials boasted that industry investment in offshore wind will leap from $8 billion in the last decade to $80 billion in the next eight years. Representatives of American firms could only watch wistfully and wish the US government cared as much about wind energy as Europe does. Peter Duclos and Tim McAuliffe were two of those wistful watchers. Gladding-Hearn, their Somerset, Mass., company, specializes in ferries, patrol boats, pilot boats, and tugboats. They want to make boats to transport workers and equipment out to turbines. “Some people estimate that for every 10 to 15 turbines, you need a vessel to get the technicians out there,” said Duclos, the company’s president. “And every active shipyard means other companies making more piping, electronics, even more business at the local liquor store.” If the East Coast had a thriving offshore-wind industry, the ship-building company could double its current workforce of 100, added McAuliffe, the company’s engineering liaison. “We could support 200 if we cranked up a second shift,” he said. “Those kind of boats are $3 million apiece. We make five or six boats a year, but we could turn out one a month. It’ll probably never happen that way, but that could be $36 million a year.” Whether that happens all depends on politics, as does the fate of the American wind industry itself. The Department of Energy estimates that the potential power generation of offshore wind is approximately four times the capacity of the current US electric-power system.

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### Impact D

#### Environmental improvements now – their evidence ignores long term trends

Hayward, 11 [Steven P, american author, political commentator, and policy scholar. He argues for libertarian and conservative viewpoints in his writings. He writes frequently on the topics of environmentalism, law, economics, and public policy.2011 Almanac of Environmental Trends¶ by Steven F. Hayward¶ April 2011¶ ISBN-13: 978-1-934276-17-4, <http://www.pacificresearch.org/docLib/20110419_almanac2011.pdf>]

Quick: What’s the largest public-policy success story in American society over the last generation? The dramatic reduction in the crime rate, which has helped make major American cities livable again? Or welfare reform, which saw the nation’s welfare rolls fall by more than half since the early 1990s? Both of these accomplishments have received wide media attention. Yet the right answer might well be the environment. As Figure 1 displays, the reduction in air pollution is comparable in magnitude to the reduction in the welfare rolls, and greater than the reduction in the crime rate—both celebrated as major public-policy success stories of the last two decades. Aggregate emissions of the six “criteria” pollutants1 regulated under the Clean Air Act have fallen by 53 percent since 1970, while the proportion of the population receiving welfare assistance is down 48 percent from 1970, and the crime rate is only 6.4 percent below its 1970 level. (And as we shall see, this aggregate nationwide reduction in emissions greatly understates the actual improvement in ambient air quality in the areas with the worst levels of air pollution.) Measures for water quality, toxic-chemical exposure, soil erosion, forest growth, wetlands, and several other areas of environmental concern show similar positive trends, as this Almanac reports. To paraphrase Mark Twain, reports of the demise of the environment have been greatly exaggerated. Moreover, there is good reason to believe that these kinds of improvements will be experienced in the rest of the world over the course of this century. We’ll examine some of the early evidence that this is already starting to occur. The chief drivers of environmental improvement are economic growth, constantly increasing resource efficiency, technological innovation in pollution control, and the deepening of environmental values among the American public that have translated to changed behavior and consumer preferences. Government regulation has played a vital role, to be sure, but in the grand scheme of things regulation can be understood as a lagging indicator, often achieving results at needlessly high cost, and sometimes failing completely. Were it not for rising affluence and technological innovation, regulation would have much the same effect as King Canute commanding the tides. INTRODUCTION introduction 3 figure 1 a comparison of crime rate, Welfare, and air Pollution, 1970–2007 -60.0% -40.0% -20.0% 0.0% 20.0% 40.0% 60.0% 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2007 % of Population on Welfare Crime Rate (per 100,000 population) Aggregate Emissions Source: FBI Uniform Crime Reports, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, EPA 4 Almanac of Environmental Trends The American public remains largely unaware of these trends. For most of the last 40 years, public opinion about the environment has been pessimistic, with large majorities—sometimes as high as 70 percent—telling pollsters that they think environmental quality in the United States is getting worse instead of better, and will continue to get worse in the future. One reason for this state of opinion is media coverage, which emphasizes bad news and crisis; another reason is environmental advocacy groups, for whom good news is bad news. As the cliche goes, you can’t sell many newspapers with headlines about airplanes landing safely, or about an oil tanker docking without a spill. Similarly, slow, long-term trends don’t make for good headline copy. INTRODUCTIONintroduction 5Improving Trends:Causes and ConsequencesMost environmental commentary dwells on the laws and regulations we have adoptedto achieve our goals, but it is essential to understand the more important role of technologyand economic growth in bringing about favorable environmental trends. Thebest way to see this is to look at some long-term trends in environmental quality thatpredate modern environmental legislation.To be sure, the earliest phases of the Industrial Revolution led to severe environmentaldegradation. But the inexorable process of technological innovation andthe drive for efficiency began to remedy much of this damage far earlier than iscommonly perceived. In addition, new technologies that we commonly regard as environmentally destructive often replaced older modes of human activity that were far worse by comparison. A good example is the introduction of coal for heating andenergy in Britain.

No impact to the environment

**Boucher 98** (Doug, "Not with a Bang but a Whimper," Science and Society, Fall, http://www.driftline.org/cgi-bin/archive/archive\_msg.cgi?file=spoon-archives/marxism-international.archive/marxism-international\_1998/marxism-international.9802&msgnum=379&start=32091&end=32412)

The political danger of catastrophism is matched by the weakness of its scientific foundation. Given the prevalence of the idea that the entire biosphere will soon collapse, it is remarkable how few good examples ecology can provide of this happening m even on the scale of an ecosystem, let alone a continent or the whole planet. Hundreds of ecological transformations, due to introductions of alien species, pollution, overexploitation, climate change and even collisions with asteroids, have been documented. They often change the functioning of ecosystems, and the abundance and diversity of their animals and plants, in dramatic ways. The effects on human society can be far-reaching, and often extremely negative for the majority of the population. But one feature has been a constant, nearly everywhere on earth: life goes on. Humans have been able to drive thousands of species to extinction, severely impoverish the soil, alter weather patterns, dramatically lower the biodiversity of natural communities, and incidentally cause great suffering for their posterity. They have not generally been able to prevent nature from growing back. As ecosystems are transformed, species are eliminated -- but opportunities are created for new ones. The natural world is changed, but never totally destroyed. Levins and Lewontin put it well: "The warning not to destroy the environment is empty: environment, like matter, cannot be created or destroyed. What we can do is replace environments we value by those we do not like" (Levins and Lewontin, 1994). Indeed, from a human point of view the most impressive feature of recorded history is that human societies have continued to grow and develop, despite all the terrible things they have done to the earth. Examples of the collapse of civilizations due to their over- exploitation of nature are few and far between. Most tend to be well in the past and poorly documented, and further investigation often shows that the reasons for collapse were fundamentally political.

### Ext – Too Late to Solve

#### Too late to solve Appalachia environmental destruction

Parenteau 1-19

Patrick, Former director of the Vermont Law School's Environmental and Natural Resources Law Clinic, AND Rob Glover staff editor at the Vermont Journal of Environmental Law

Mountaintop Removal Mining Proves Hard to Stop. Environmental Protection online. http://eponline.com/articles/2013/01/1

Mountaintop removal is a form of surface mining used extensively throughout Appalachia that uses explosives to remove the summits of mountains to expose coal seams. Excess rock and soil laden with toxic mining byproducts are often dumped into nearby valleys in what are called "valley fills." The practice has destroyed more than 500 mountaintops, filled thousands of miles of streams, and clear-cut a million acres of highland forest. Peer-reviewed studies show that mountaintop mining has serious environmental impacts, including loss of biodiversity and degradation of watersheds that mitigation practices cannot successfully address. The coal industry adopted mountaintop removal as a more efficient means of mining that requires fewer workers. Between 1973 and 2003, coal mining employment fell 40 percent as massive earth-moving equipment replaced miners. On June 11, 2009, the Obama administration announced plans to toughen standards for mountaintop removal mining. Officials from EPA, the Army Corps of Engineers, the Interior Department, and the White House Council on Environmental Quality announced a more rigorous environmental and legal review of pending and future permit applications. Under the Clean Water Act, the Corps has lead responsibility for issuing permits, but the act gives EPA a strong oversight role in the permit process. In 2010, EPA placed a "hold" on 17 permits to review their impacts and determine whether to exercise its “veto” authority under section 404 (c) of the act. Ultimately, after requiring additional mitigation measures, the EPA released the hold for all but one -- it vetoed the permit for the Spruce Mine, which would have been the largest new mine in Central Appalachia and for which the Corps issued Mingo Logan a Clean Water Act permit in 2007, allowing Mingo Logan to discharge "fill material" into stream segments. After unsuccessfully seeking modification of the Corps permit, EPA initiated a 404 (c) action seeking to block the use of two stream disposal sites that encompassed a majority of Mingo Logan's discharge area. Mingo Logan filed suit, and the court ruled that once the corps issued the permit, EPA lost its "veto" power. In a harshly worded opinion, Judge Amy Jackson accused EPA of "magical thinking" in its interpretation of the Clean Water Act. Jackson felt that EPA's position would create huge uncertainty among the regulated community if permits could be revoked "after the fact." In a second case filed in 2010 by the National Mining Association and the states of West Virginia and Kentucky, Judge Reggie Walton rejected EPA’s argument that its stream water conductivity guidance was "non-binding" and cited evidence the EPA regional offices were in fact treating it as if it were mandatory. The court ruled that EPA exceeded its authority under the Clean Water Act and the Surface Mining and Reclamation Act by imposing a stream water conductivity standard on permit requests for surface coal mines.

## politics

### protectionism

#### Protectionism won’t cause military conflict

Bradford 9 (Anu, Assistant Professor of Law at the University of Chicago Law School, Future of the WTO, http://uchicagolaw.typepad.com/faculty/2009/02/future-of-the-wto-governing-the-world-economy-beyond-trade.html)

Acknowledging this shift towards regionalism, Richard asks: “Will we see competition between blocs? Cooperation between them? What will be the implications for multilateralism?” China’s recent effort to build closer trade relations with its Asian neighbors is one of the most interesting developments. That trend is likely to continue. Greg seems correct in doubting the emergence of coherent rival geopolitical blocks. But the most important regional trade deals will be built around the US, EU and China. In addition, we will see a fragmented web of PTAs within, across and beyond the key trade regions. I would predict some competition but no confrontation among regional blocks. We may see attempts of the “big three” – the US, EU and China – to expand their spheres of economic influence though negotiating PTAs with other states, in particular the energy-rich states in the Middle East, Central Asia and Africa.

### no rising powers

#### No rising powers

Bremmer and Gordon 11 (Ian Bremmer is president of Eurasia Group and author of “The End of the Free Market: Who Wins the War Between States and Corporations?” David F. Gordon, former director of policy planning at the State Department, is head of research at Eurasia Group, “An Upbeat View of America's 'Bad' Year”, <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/28/opinion/an-upbeat-view-of-americas-bad-year.html?pagewanted=all>, December 27, 2011,

Among global big thinkers, never a bashful crowd, the notion of a United States in decline has become conventional wisdom. In late 2011, this narrative has crescendoed, with experts arguing that China has surpassed the United States economically, Niall Ferguson declaring that we are at “the end of 500 years of Western predominance” and The National Interest proclaiming “the end of the American era.” Even the National Intelligence Council’s coming Global Trends 2030 study reportedly assumes an America in decline. As 2011 draws to a close, the U.S. military’s exit from Iraq and challenges in Afghanistan along with American vulnerability to the European crisis provide further confirmation of the decline narrative. We agree with some of these views. The United States has neither the willingness nor the capability to provide the kind of global leadership that it has provided in the past several decades, and other countries are increasingly less willing to follow America’s lead. But the conventional wisdom obscures as much as it reveals. Specifically, the declinists overlook the inconvenient truth that global power is relative. And comparing America’s year to that of our present and potential adversaries paints an interesting picture: 2011 was not the year when the United States fell off the wagon. Instead, a look back at the past 12 months suggests that **U.S. power is more resilient than the narrative of inevitable decline portrays.** Take Al Qaeda, our most consistent adversary (by their definition and ours) since the 9/11 attacks. Despite some severe missteps, we have in 10 years degraded Al Qaeda’s capabilities to the point that they are having difficulty mounting attacks against significant targets. In 2011, the United States killed Al Qaeda’s most effective propagandist, Anwar al-Awlaki; its operating chief, Atiyah Abd al-Rahman; and of course its founder, chief executive and spiritual leader, Osama bin Laden. Moreover, the Arab Spring undercut the notion that political change in the Middle East requires the violent jihad that Bin Laden spent his career espousing. The fight against extremist Islam is an impossible one in which to declare success. Yet the fact remains that while Al Qaeda began the War on Terror with a horrific assault on the foremost symbols of U.S. economic and military power, it leaves 2011 effectively leaderless, rudderless and reduced to boasting about kidnapping defenseless U.S. aid workers. Iran’s leaders also exit 2011 in worse shape than they entered it. Early in the year, they viewed the demise of Middle Eastern potentates as accelerating their rise to regional dominance. Turkish anger over the Mavi Marmara incident continued to draw Ankara closer to Tehran. Saudi anger at the perceived lack of U.S. support for Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak seemed to threaten a permanent rupture in the U.S. relationship with a key ally, and Iran assumed that it would be the beneficiary of declining American influence in the Arab World. But the Arab Spring has unfolded very differently. Iran’s closest, most vital, and in some ways only Arab ally, Syria’s Bashar al-Assad, ends the year leading an embattled, isolated regime facing a combination of civil war and economic sanctions that his government is unlikely to survive. Iran’s relationship with Turkey has deteriorated sharply, and, along with Saudi Arabia, Ankara has in fact drawn closer to the United States. Indeed, the nascent U.S.-Turkey-Saudi troika is one of the most important but least noticed trends of the past few months. Combined with another year without nuclear weapons — the program apparently thwarted significantly by covert operations — and a tightening vise of economic sanctions, these events have left Iran’s leaders disoriented. After years of growing consensus, Iran’s elites are now increasingly fragmented and at one another’s throats. Moreover, Tehran spent the past few months engaged in a stunning series of blunders: plotting with Mexican drug dealers to assassinate the Saudi ambassador to the United States and allowing regime supporters to storm the British Embassy in Tehran, the combination of which has re-energized global efforts to squeeze Iran financially. The assumption that Iran is the emerging regional power has shattered. China, which most of the declinists identify as America’s greatest future rival, has likewise had a difficult 2011. With U.S. willingness to lead receding, the international spotlight has fallen on Beijing. And on every issue — the euro zone crisis, climate change and rebalancing the global economy — China has declined to take the lead, to criticism and dismay at home and abroad. Beijing has failed to reconcile rising domestic nationalism with assuaging its neighbors’ increasing alarm over Chinese economic sustainability and strategic hegemony. China’s miscalculations in Northeast and Southeast Asia have allowed the United States to reassert traditional alliances in the region (with Japan and South Korea), establish new beachheads (placing a permanent U.S. Marine Corps presence in Australia), and create a process and institutions (the Trans-Pacific Partnership) for a balanced Asia–Pacific regional architecture, rather than one dominated by the Middle Kingdom. Compared to this, 2011 has not been a bad year for America. It is a stretch to call the Iraq war a victory, but the endgame in the Afghan quagmire is slowly coming into focus. And for all our fiscal problems, global funding has to flow somewhere, and our capital markets are still unparalleled. China won’t internationalize the renminbi, the euro is fragile and gold is not a country. As a result, the dollar remains the world’s reserve currency, and U.S. Treasury bills the global financial safe haven. This will inevitably change in the long term, but not for quite some time. The unipolar moment is over. But for 2011 at least, the world order has remained the United States and the rest.

### terror

#### Nuclear terror strike won’t cause extinction

John Mueller, professor of political science at the University of Rochester, and Karl Mueller, assistant professor of Comparative Military Studies at the School of Advanced Airpower Studies at Maxwell Air Force Base, May/June 1999, Foreign Affairs, “Sanctions of Mass Destruction,” p. Lexis

Nuclear weapons clearly deserve the “weapons of mass destruction” designation because they can indeed destroy masses of people in a single blow. Even so, it is worth noting that any nuclear weapons acquired by terrorist groups or rogue states, at least initially, are likely to be small. Contrary to exaggerated Indian and Pakistani claims, for example, independent analyses of their May 1998 nuclear tests have concluded that the yields were Hiroshima-sized or smaller. Such bombs can cause horrible though not apocalyptic damage. Some 70,000 people died in Hiroshima and 40,000 in Nagasaki. People three miles away from the blast sites received only superficial wounds even when fully exposed, and those inside bomb shelters at Nagasaki were uninjured even though they were close to ground zero. Some buildings of steel and concrete survived, even when they were close to the blast centers, and most municipal services were restored within days. A Hiroshima-sized bomb exploded in a more fire-resistant modern city would likely be considerably less devastating. Used against well-prepared, dug-in, and dispersed troops, a small bomb might actually cause only limited damage. If a single such bomb or even a few of them were to fall into dangerous hands, therefore, it would be terrible, though it would hardly threaten the end of civilization.

### prolif

#### No widespread prolif

Hymans 12

Jacques Hymans, USC Associate Professor of IR, 4/16/12, North Korea's Lessons for (Not) Building an Atomic Bomb, www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137408/jacques-e-c-hymans/north-koreas-lessons-for-not-building-an-atomic-bomb?page=show

Washington's miscalculation is not just a product of the difficulties of seeing inside the Hermit Kingdom. It is also a result of the broader tendency to overestimate the pace of global proliferation. For decades, Very Serious People have predicted that strategic weapons are about to spread to every corner of the earth. **Such warnings have routinely proved wrong** - for instance, the intelligence assessments that led to the 2003 invasion of Iraq - but they continue to be issued. In reality, despite the diffusion of the relevant technology and the knowledge for building nuclear weapons, the world has been experiencing a great proliferation slowdown. Nuclear weapons programs around the world are taking much longer to get off the ground - and their failure rate is much higher - than they did during the first 25 years of the nuclear age.

As I explain in my article "Botching the Bomb" in the upcoming issue of Foreign Affairs, the key reason for the great proliferation slowdown is the absence of strong cultures of scientific professionalism in most of the recent crop of would-be nuclear states, which in turn is a consequence of their poorly built political institutions. In such dysfunctional states, the quality of technical workmanship is low, there is little coordination across different technical teams, and technical mistakes lead not to productive learning but instead to finger-pointing and recrimination. **These problems are debilitating**, and **they cannot be fixed** simply by bringing in more imported parts through illicit supply networks. In short, as a struggling proliferator, North Korea has a lot of company.

### disease

#### Containment and medicine solves

Economist 10, 11/22/10

(<http://www.economist.com/node/17493456>)

Fortunately, globalisation will also speed the flow of health data. In 2011 the growing field of digital epidemiology will attract more students, health officials and resources than ever before. People in viral hotspots around the world will report suspicious human and animal deaths (often a warning sign of a coming plague) by mobile phones. These data will be posted to the web, instantly enriching the data that came from traditional surveillance systems and electronic medical records. Organisations like Google.org will scour search patterns around the world, expanding their search-based predictions of influenza to other infectious diseases. Still more creative early-detection systems will begin to pull together illness information present in social-networking sites like Facebook and Twitter, allowing us to see changing disease patterns before they make the morning news. Novel laboratory approaches to the discovery of new viruses will emerge. The long-awaited era of single-molecule DNA sequencing will begin in earnest with new machines from companies like Pacific Biosciences, and with a bit of luck this will improve the speed at which we can recognise unknown bugs. At the cutting edge, new studies of virus evolution and chips housing tiny cell cultures will improve our capacity to sort through the viral chatter and determine if a newly identified outbreak has the potential to spread globally or is likely to fade away. The discovery of new viruses will make the move from universities to laboratories around the world, helping to facilitate international scientific collaboration and decrease fears of biopiracy. Towards a global immune system In 2011 you may be among those who will watch “Contagion”, a forthcoming movie about a frightening fictional pandemic. But whether you are a head of state wary of the political and economic costs of a disease catastrophe, a CEO concerned by supply-chain and staff disruption associated with the next pandemic or a citizen worried about your family, in 2011 you will have access to better, more accurate and rapidly available data on actual outbreaks. In the increasingly popular Silicon Valley model, organisations like ours will mash up multiple data sources—combining lab results in far-flung viral listening-posts with international news feeds, text messages, social-networking and search patterns to create a new form of epidemic intelligence. The past ten years have seen noteworthy progress in the development of truly global systems. In the world of outbreaks, 2011 will mark the beginning of the development of a worldwide immune system that will detect and respond to biological threats before they go global. Although this will take years to build fully, if successful it could make pandemic anniversaries a thing of the past.

# 1nr

### impact calc

#### Escalation is highly probable

Geller 5 (Daniel S. – Professor and Chair of the Department of Political Science at Wayne State University, The India-Pakistan Conflict: An Enduring Rivalry, Ed. T. V. Paul, p. 99)

In fact, both the May-July 1999 military engagement between India and Pakistan over Kashmir and the crisis of December 2001-June 2002 after the terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament mirrored the conflict escalation pattern for nuclear-armed states. Each side initiated troop mobilization and general military alerts, coupled with the evacuation of civilians from border-area villages. However, the outcome of the future confrontations for India and Pakistan may not adhere to the pattern established by other nuclear dyads. Elements are present in this dyad that were largely absent between other nuclear-armed antagonists and that make the escalation of war more probable. Among those factors are the presence of a contiguous border between India and Pakistan, a history of multiple wars, and an ongoing territorial dispute. These factors, among others,79 increase the likelihood that an Indo-Pakistani dispute will turn violent and that the violence will escalate to war irrespective of the presence of nuclear weapons.

### impact uniqueness

#### U.S.-India relations are not resilient

Tellis 12 – Senior Associate, South Asia Program (Ashley J., 11/29, “A New Friendship: U.S.-India Relations,” http://carnegieendowment.org/globalten/?fa=50147)

Building on this evolution in American policy toward India since Bill Clinton, President Barack Obama has already underscored India’s strategic and economic significance for the United States. Future policies should build on Obama’s vision but even more importantly translate it into an “all of government” effort that deepens the partnership on multiple dimensions. This goal, however, could prove challenging and will require strong resolve. The second Obama term will likely confront a series of potentially serious dangers relating to Iran, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Syria, and possibly China—in addition to all the domestic challenges of accelerating a slow economic recovery. Given these realities, it is possible that the task of exploiting breakthroughs will be shortchanged amid the struggle to overcome calamities. In Washington, as in many other capitals, addressing the urgent invariably dominates engaging the important. Strong U.S.-India relations will continue to be important for American interests in the years ahead. But continuing the renovation of U.S.-India ties represents an opportunity to be realized rather than a crisis to be overcome. The difference between a distracted and a concerted effort to sustain a favorable Asian geopolitical equilibrium could set the course for the relationship. The evolving U.S.-India strategic partnership could simply languish as yet another historical curiosity embodying some vague potential or it could actually advance important common interests.

### AT Money Now

#### Congress actually cut energy funding for REAP

Jessen 1-2

Holly, Biomass Magazine, Farm bill contains no mandatory funding for energy title programs, http://www.biomassmagazine.com/articles/8467/farm-bill-contains-no-mandatory-funding-for-energy-title-programs

The good news is that legislators came through at the 11th hour and passed the “fiscal cliff bill,” which extended the farm bill through Sept. 30 and several biofuel-related tax incentives through 2013.The bad news is, all mandatory funding for energy title programs were stripped from the farm bill at the last moment. “The programs have lived, but they don’t have money,” said Lloyd Ritter, co-director of the Agriculture Energy Coalition. “Unless the appropriators decide to fund them and that’s a tough battle given the appropriations situation.” Growth Energy released a statement that commended members of the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives for passing the American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012. Still, CEO Tom Buis said that, while the biofuel tax extensions were needed, longer-term solutions were imperative. He also said that removing mandatory funding for energy programs effectively killed funding to ethanol infrastructure development through Rural Energy for America Program and second-generation feedstock development through Biomass Crop Assistance Program and the Biorefinery Assistance Program. “As the 113th Congress convenes this Thursday, I urge them to revisit these provisions and act to provide the stability and funding necessary to ensure robust growth and continued success for the renewable fuels industry moving forward,” he said in a prepared statement. Other biofuel and biomass related energy programs include the Biomass Research and Development program, the Rural Energy Self-Sufficiency Initiative, the Feedstock Flexibility Program for Bioenergy Producers and the Forest Biomass for Energy and Community Wood Energy Program. Ritter called it highly unfortunate that mandatory funding for energy title programs was removed from the bill. The changes happened at the last minute, and it differed from the agreement that had been hammered out by the ag committees in the House and Senate. “The ag committees had a bipartisan, bicameral approach that we thought was a pretty good solution,” he said. “It had a reasonable amount of mandatory funding for core energy title programs.” The changes were negotiated by minority leader Sen. Mitch McConnell, R-Ky. “We really had a good package together for agriculture and ag energy and we lost the energy piece and some other pieces,” Ritter said. “Funding was stripped from a variety of different sections, not just energy, and there were quite a few changes in the overall bill.”

### at: pc theory wrong

#### Polarization makes PC more important, not less

Beckmann and McGann 8 (http://jtp.sagepub.com Journal of Theoretical Politics DOI: 10.1177/0951629807085818 2008; 20; 201 Journal of Theoretical Politics Matthew N. Beckmann and Anthony J. McGann Navigating the Legislative Divide: Polarization, Presidents, and Policymaking in the United States, MATTHEW N. BECKMANN is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of California, Irvine. He is currently working on a book-length project that explains and tests a new theory of presidents’ inﬂuence on Capitol Hill, 1953–2004. ANTHONY J. MCGANN is Associate Professor of Political Science at theUni- versity of California, Irvine and Reader in Government at the University of Essex.)

We can generalize these ﬁndings to the case where the president needs to target more than one vote, as would be the case in this example if a super-majority was required. If the president needs n votes to pass measure o1 and C(o, si Þ is linear, then he will need to pay 2n times the cost of a median senator. In this case it is not clear that it is cheaper for the president to get his measure passed in the polarized case; it depends on the number of votes he has to buy. In the polarized case each vote is relatively expensive, so if the president has to buy many votes, it may be more expensive than in a more homogenous case. Polarization’s advantage to the president, after all, was **that it allowed him to concentrate his resources on the few senators who will have a very signiﬁcant effect**. Therefore, polarization generally works to the president’s advantage pro- vided the president is in a situation where winning over a few voters can signiﬁ- cantly change the outcome (i.e. the polarization is distributed around the pivotal voter). If many members are clustered at the pivot point, any additional polariza- tion will limit presidential inﬂuence, produce policy stalemate, and reinforce legislative gridlock. Discussion By all indications, **the partisan and ideological polarization that has come to characterize ofﬁcials in Washington shows no signs of abating.** If anything, it appears that the schism between liberals and conservatives, Democrats and Republicans, will only continue to grow. The simple but important question that many have asked is, so what? How does polarization affect the policymaking process and the outcomes that result? While Mayhew’s initial study proved important laws continue to prevail even in the face of divided government and polarization, subsequent research has indicated that partisan and ideological polarization does encourage legislative gridlock, which, in turn, privileges the status quo. This happens partly by germinating partisanship and posturing over negotiation and compromise, and partly by leaving ideologically distant pivotal voters unable to ﬁnd an alternative they prefer even when they seek compromise and negotiate sincerely. By contrast, we theorize that polarization’s impact on US lawmaking **is conditional**. Instead of hypothesizing gridlock monotonically increases with polari- zation, our model predicts polarization’s policymaking impact depends on three elements: the default preference of the pivotal voter, the extent of polarization around the pivotal voter, and the president’s willingness (and ability) to spend his capital to win. Depending on the particular constellation of these factors, predictions range from the familiar one of gridlock on through to a president who not only avoids stalemate, but actually signs into law bills that are closer to his preference than we would otherwise expect. Drawing from this model, then, a more nuanced view of presidential inﬂu- ence emerges. Assuming today’s White House ofﬁcials are eager to promote the president’s legislative agenda, we can now see when **those efforts are likely to pay off – namely, when the president enjoys ample political capital** and confronts a polarized legislature (i.e. one where there are few legislators sitting between the pivotal voter and some point much closer to the president). Con- versely**,** when the president does not get involved or lacks political capital when he does, **all the conventional wisdom about pivotal voters and gridlock holds**. Also, any president promoting his agenda before a homogenous Senate (say, one characterized by a normal distribution of preferences) is highly constrained by its predispositions. Therefore, as future researchers revisit presidents’ potential inﬂuence in Congress, accounting for its conditional nature should provide more discriminating results and permit more judicious inferences.

#### Best studies prove

Beckmann and McGann 8. [Matthew, Associate Professor of Political Science at UC Irvine, Anthony, “Navigating the Legislative Divide: Polarization, Presidents, and Policymaking in the United States” Journal of Theoretical Politics Vol 20]

Here we propose a theory that casts some early rays of light onto the policy consequences of polarization in Congress. Building from a simple theoretical model in which the president seeks to promote his preferred policies in the Senate (see Snyder, 1991; Groseclose, 1996), we assess differences in the chamber’s preference distribution – from normal to unanimous to bimodal – as well as the ‘political capital’ at the president’s disposal.2 Results show that absent the president, ideological polarization makes amassing the votes needed to beat the status quo difficult, so gridlock frequently prevails. The same is true when the president lacks political capital to spend. However, when endowed with abundant capital, facing a polarized legislature enables presidents to pass policies closer to their ideal than would have been possible in an assembly characterized by greater ideological homogeneity. Hence the familiar prediction of blanket ‘gridlock’ is overblown. Instead, comparative statics show that the consequences of ideological polarization in Congress are conditional: they depend on the nature of the preference distribution, the involvement of the president, and the political capi- tal at his disposal.

### at: winners win

**Winners lose – taking a hard line fails**

**Page 1-15** [Susan, Washington Bureau Chief, "How Obama can avoid the second-term curse" USA Today -- www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2013/01/14/obama-second-term-curse/1834765/]

2. **Pick a priority**¶ The president can do something in his second term, the veterans say, but not everything. **Fighting too many battles could mean winning none.**¶ Obama has said his major goals for his second term include enacting a comprehensive immigration bill and energy legislation, and he has added gun control to the list since the December shooting rampage at a Newtown, Conn., elementary school that left 26 children and educators dead. In the next few months, he also faces the need to raise the debt ceiling and deal with automatic spending cuts that are poised to take effect.¶ Some veterans say his list is unrealistically long. "It's still not clear to me what they really want to do," Perino says.¶ The hard line Obama has drawn with Republicans on the debt ceiling risks sapping his political capital and leaving scars that will make prevailing on the other issues more difficult, Fagen says. "If he spends this year fighting with Republicans on the debt ceiling and the fiscal cliff, yeah, (House Speaker) John Boehner may lose the hand on that," she says, but Obama "is the one who is going to be harmed the most long-term."¶ After carrying 49 states in his re-election, Reagan focused on overhauling the tax code, and succeeded. Bush also picked a clear second-term priority — adding private investment accounts to Social Security — only to see it crash in Congress. His next proposal, to overhaul immigration, also failed.¶ Bush told reporters after his re-election that he had "earned capital in the campaign, political capital, and now I intend to spend it." To his dismay, he apparently hadn't earned enough capital to push through such divisive proposals.¶ Obama made a similar point at his news conference Monday when asked about a pending showdown with Republicans over raising the debt ceiling. "They've got a particular view of what government should do and should be," he said. "And, you know, that view was rejected by the American people when it was debated during the presidential campaign."¶ **Obama needs to be realistic about not "misinterpreting the size of his victory**," Fagen says. "That is a recipe for having a very long and cantankerous legislative session with little accomplished."

\*\*\* GW Bush’s press secretary Dana Perino, Sara Taylor Fagen, political adviser in Bush's second term

**Winners don’t win in the second term – short timeframe, midterms, pc limited**

**Nicholas 1-27** [Peter, White House Correspondent, "Republicans Bristle at Obama's New Roster" Wall Street Journal -- online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323644904578268232471085850.html]

Ken Duberstein, who served as chief of staff in Ronald Reagan's second term, said Mr. Obama might rethink his approach and find ways to compromise. "He has to do it if he is to accomplish his broad agenda," he said. "**You can't just do it by sticking your finger in people's eyes**."¶ Mr. Obama has four more years in office. But in practical terms, he needs to move quickly to advance his domestic agenda. A re-elected president has finite political capital and a compressed period to act before Congress is diverted by the midterm elections and then the next presidential election.

### Politics Links – PC

#### Coal industry will backlash

#### Lipton 12

Eric, NYT, Even in Coal Country, the Fight for an Industry: May 29, 2012

But the coal industry is mustering all the weapons it can: lobbying, legislation, litigation and a multimillion-dollar advertising campaign trumpeting the benefits of “clean coal.” The fight has even become an issue in the presidential campaign, with the industry blaming President Obama and the Environmental Protection Agency for the onslaught, and Mitt Romney, the presumptive Republican nominee, hinting that he would roll back some of the rules. Here in Kentucky, the intervention by Mr. Adkins and other coal industry advocates has saved coal at Big Sandy, at least temporarily. American Electric Power, which is based in Columbus, Ohio, is proposing a $1 billion retrofit to allow the plant to continue burning coal and has asked Kentucky regulators to approve a 30 percent increase in electricity rates to pay for the work. But that request, which will come up for a vote by the state’s utility commission within the next week, has inspired resistance from some residents, large industrial companies that consume much of Kentucky’s electricity and even the state attorney general’s office. Pressured on the domestic front, some giant American coal producers, like Arch Coal and Peabody Energy, are shifting their attention to markets overseas, where coal-fired power plants are being built faster than they are being abandoned in the United States. Even if Big Sandy continues to eat up 90 rail cars of coal a day, the industry’s decline is evident here. Sales to Midwestern power plants have slumped, as has the market price of coal, dropping so suddenly that many local mines are cutting back hours or closing. A warm winter, decreasing demand, only made matters worse. “I call it the imperfect storm,” Mr. Adkins said. “And it is breaking the back of our local economy.” A Coordinated Effort The anger toward Washington is palpable in this impoverished corner of Eastern Kentucky, where miners display bumper stickers or license plates on their pickup trucks with slogans like “Coal Keeps the Lights On” or “If Obama Is the Answer, How Stupid Was the Question?” It is hard to find anyone here who does not feel affected by the fate of Big Sandy. Just as the smokestack at the plant towers over the countryside, Big Sandy dominates much of life here. Danny Sartin, 61, a barrel-chested heavy equipment operator at the plant, said his father, grandfathers and uncles all worked in local mines that feed Big Sandy. “Coal and the coal mining industry, it’s all we have ever known,” Mr. Sartin said. Some of that coal comes from the Licking River mine, about 50 miles south of Big Sandy, where miners rip apart hillsides to reach vast seams just below the surface. Chris Lacy, 41, an executive at Licking River Resources Inc., said layoffs among his 350 miners — in Magoffin County, where unemployment is already 17.5 percent — are inevitable if the coal furnaces at Big Sandy go cold. Even the garden supply company that Mr. Lacy’s father-in-law owns and where his two sons work indirectly relies on Big Sandy, because mines are required to plant grass over the scarred earth they leave behind. “It is the ripple effect that comes right through us,” Mr. Lacy said. Channeling the animosity toward Washington and fears about their livelihoods, coal producers, union leaders, landowners and railroads came together to pressure American Electric Power to back down on its plan to close the coal furnaces at Big Sandy. They have leaned on county judges, state legislators and other politicians to attempt to silence public criticism of the 30 percent electricity rate increase and to pressure the Kentucky Public Service Commission to approve the retrofit project.

#### Renewable energy funding specifically causes backlash

Jalonick 1/13/13 (Mary, Farm Bill Extension Evidence Of Agriculture Sector's Lost Political Clout, <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/01/03/farm-bill-extension_n_2405822.html>)

Senate Republican leader Mitch McConnell of Kentucky added a bare-bones version of a farm bill extension that didn't include money for any of the agriculture leaders' top priorities and renewed other farm programs without any new funding.¶ The result, the aides said, was a farm bill extension that would keep major programs going but didn't spend any new money. Missing were dollars for some organic programs, environmental programs and several different energy programs for encouraging renewable fuels. Many of those programs were renewed, but without any money.¶ The reaction from farm-state lawmakers was swift. Stabenow went to the Senate floor called the new bill "absolutely outrageous." Peterson said farm-state leaders had been "disrespected." Stabenow, as well as Lucas, ended up voting for it, Peterson against.¶ The National Farmers Union issued a statement saying it was "left out in the cold." The long-powerful National Corn Growers Association's statement said the group is "tired of the endless excuses and lack of accountability."¶ Direct payments, a subsidy that costs $5 billion annually and is paid to farmers whether they farm or not, were retained in the agreement. Both a Senate bill passed in June and a House Agriculture Committee bill passed in July had cut those payments after a consensus in the farm community that those subsidies would be eliminated and redirected

### uniqueness run

#### Top Dems

Reuters 2/3 ["Reid predicts Congress will pass immigration legislation" -- news.yahoo.com/reid-predicts-u-congress-pass-immigration-legislation-172812947.html]

The top Senate Democrat on Sunday predicted that Congress will pass and send to President Barack Obama legislation overhauling the U.S. immigration system, saying "things are looking really good."¶ Obama last week expressed hope Congress can get a deal done on immigration, possibly in the first half of the year.¶ The president is proposing to give the roughly 11 million U.S. illegal immigrants - most of whom are Hispanics - a pathway to citizenship, a step that many Republicans have long fought.¶ Obama's fellow Democrats control the Senate, but Republicans control the House of Representatives.¶ Appearing on the ABC program "This Week," Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid was asked whether immigration legislation can win House passage.¶ "Well, it's certainly going to pass the Senate. And it would be a bad day for our country and a bad day for the Republican Party if they continue standing in the way of this. So the answer is yes," Reid said.¶ Obama choose Reid's home state of Nevada, with a sizable Hispanic population, as the site for a major speech last Tuesday pushing Congress to pass an immigration bill.¶ Hispanic voters were crucial in helping Obama beat Republican nominee Mitt Romney - who advocated "self-deportation" of illegal immigrants - in Nevada in November.¶ "It has to get done," Reid said of immigration legislation.¶ "It's really easy to write principles. To write legislation is much harder. And once we write the legislation, then you have to get it passed. But I think things are looking really good," Reid added.¶ After years on the back burner, immigration reform has suddenly looked possible as Republicans, chastened by the fact that more than 70 percent of Hispanic voters backed Obama in the November election, appear more willing to accept an overhaul.

#### Obama has the upper hand now

Reuters 2/4 www.reuters.com/article/2013/02/04/us-usa-immigration-idUSBRE9130V620130204

Obama is expected to use his February 12 State of the Union speech to Congress - a major annual address by the president in which he lays out his legislative priorities for the year - to keep the heat on Republicans, who appear more willing to accept an immigration overhaul after they were chastened by Latino voters' rejection in the November election.¶ But differences have emerged since Obama and a bipartisan Senate working "group of eight" rolled out their proposals last week aimed at the biggest U.S. immigration revamp in decades.¶ Obama wants to give America's 11 million illegal immigrants a clear process to achieve citizenship, including payment of fines, criminal background checks and going to the "back of the line" behind legal applicants. He has vowed to introduce his own bill if Congress fails to act in a timely fashion.¶ But top Republicans want to defer citizenship until the county's borders are deemed more secure - a linkage that Obama and most of his fellow Democrats would find hard to accept.¶ Obama's aides are confident the president has enough leverage to avoid giving ground - not least because they believe that if the reform effort fails in Congress, voters are more likely to blame the Republicans and they would suffer in the 2014 midterm congressional elections.

#### GOP getting on board

Merrills and Coffey 24 [Andrew, Justin, lawyers @ Ogletree Deakins, "Post-election immigration reform - What's at issue?" Lexology -- www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=fec318c5-d79a-4a70-8b8d-3ed17e59f65d]

The prospect of comprehensive immigration reform appears to be gaining momentum. On January 28, a bipartisan group of eight senators announced a broad proposal for immigration reform. Meanwhile, a similar bipartisan effort is underway in the House and, as this issue was going to press, it was expected that President Obama would announce his proposal for comprehensive immigration reform.¶ The Senate Proposal¶ The Senate proposal has four basic elements: (1) a path to legalization for illegal immigrants; (2) increased border security; (3) increased employer verification requirements; and (4) increased employment-based immigration. Illegal immigrants would pay monetary penalties to legalize but would not be eligible for permanent resident status until other enforcement-related measures are in place (such as increased border security).¶ The proposal would also increase certain types of employment-based immigration and allow individuals who have an advanced degree in science, technology, engineering, or mathematics from a U.S. university to obtain permanent resident status. The proposal includes increased fines and criminal penalties for employers that knowingly employ unauthorized workers.¶ Highlights of the proposal include:¶ Increased border security (additional unmanned drones, surveillance equipment, and border agents);¶ Entry-exit system to monitor visa overstays;¶ A commission to provide a recommendation as to whether increased border security measures have been completed;¶ A government registry for illegal immigrants who must pass background checks, pay fines, and back taxes in order to obtain temporary legal status (when increased border security measures are completed they can apply for permanent resident status behind others who have already applied);¶ A quicker path to legalization for foreign nationals that were brought to the United States as children;¶ A reduction in the immigrant visa backlogs for both family-based and employment-based immigration;¶ Permanent resident status for individuals who have an advanced degree in science, technology, engineering, or mathematics from U.S. universities;¶ Electronic verification of employment authorization and identity for new hires;¶ Increased fines and criminal penalties for employers that knowingly employ unauthorized workers;¶ Increased employment-based immigration where it can be demonstrated that employment of a foreign national would not displace U.S. workers;¶ Creation of an agricultural worker program;¶ Increased or decreased immigration for lower-skilled workers as needed depending on economic conditions; and¶ Permanent resident status for long-term employees who have contributed to the community and to the workplace.¶ Reaction from the White House¶ Initial reaction from the White House to the Senate’s proposal has been positive; and with a similar bipartisan effort underway in the House, the prospect of comprehensive immigration reform seems a possibility. President Obama has made comprehensive immigration reform a priority, referencing the idea in recent speeches including his inaugural address.¶ With approximately 70 percent of Latinos voting for Obama in the past election, Republicans appear to have become more receptive to a comprehensive overhaul of immigration laws. Latinos accounted for approximately 11 percent of the electorate in 2012 (up from eight percent in 2008) and this community has been especially important in key swing states, such as Florida, Colorado, Nevada, and New Mexico. More than two-thirds of exit polls were in favor of comprehensive immigration reform.¶ The perception is that Republicans have alienated the Latino community, the fastest-growing demographic group in the country, on the immigration issue. Immigration policy, largely overlooked during President Obama’s first term, has now re-emerged as a key issue as Republicans scurry to rebound from their election performance, motivated by the need to repair the electoral damage through comprehensive immigration reform.¶ The fact that Latinos cast significantly fewer votes for Mitt Romney than they had for previous Republican presidential candidates has led to an ostensible shift in the GOP’s position on immigration, forcing Republicans to reconsider their opposition to reform. In fact, following the election, many Republican Congressional Leaders (including House Speaker John Boehner), well aware of the election results, the polls, and demographic trends, have stepped forward to show support for comprehensive immigration reform.

### at: pc not key

#### Framing argument – immigration reform will pass only if Obama uses capital – overcomes all current roadblocks

Des Moines Register 1-22-13 www.desmoinesregister.com/article/20130122/OPINION03/301220049/0/NEWS/?odyssey=nav%7Chead&nclick\_check=1

Taken as an agenda for his second term, Monday’s inaugural address included references to immigration, climate change, gay rights, voting rights and safe schools. Achieving those things will require the president mounting his bully pulpit to put heat on Congress to pass comprehensive immigration reform, protections for the rights of gays and lesbians, gun control, environmental regulation and expansion of renewable forms of energy.¶ President Obama again demonstrated his gift of oratory on Monday. He delivered a well-crafted inaugural address with inspiring themes woven throughout and a call to action for our generation to achieve the ideals of previous generations.¶ But Obama should have learned in his first term that it is not enough to state lofty goals in great speeches. It takes hard work, perseverance and tough-mindedness to deal with members of Congress who may not want him to succeed.

**Capital key to keep pressure on the House – empirics**

**Brownstein 2-4** [Ronald, Editorial Director, "Bush's immigration failure offers Obama a lesson" National Journal -- www.nationaljournal.com/thenextamerica/immigration/bush-s-immigration-failure-offers-obama-a-lesson-20130204]

Already many of the same dynamics are developing, with President Obama stamping immigration reform as a **top priority**, a bipartisan Senate coalition reassembling, a broad outside alliance of support groups coalescing—and most House Republicans rejecting anything that hints at “amnesty” for illegal immigrants. Yet the contrasts between now and 2006, particularly in the political climate, are also significant. Understanding both the similarities and the differences will be critical for reform advocates if they are to avoid replicating the disappointment they suffered under Bush.¶ **Presidential interest** was then, as it is now, **critical in elevating immigration reform**. Since his days as Texas governor, Bush had courted Hispanics, and—even during the 2000 GOP presidential primary campaign—he strikingly defended illegal immigrants as “moms and dads” trying to make a better life for their children. Together with his political “architect,” Karl Rove, Bush saw comprehensive reform that coupled a path to citizenship with tougher enforcement as an opportunity to consolidate the beachhead that allowed him to capture more than 40 percent of Hispanic voters in his 2004 reelection.¶ But Bush largely looked away when Republicans who controlled the House channeled that impulse in a very different direction. In December 2005, they passed an enforcement-only bill drafted by Judiciary Committee Chairman Jim Sensenbrenner of Wisconsin, that, for the first time, designated all undocumented immigrants as felons. (Previously, illegal presence in the U.S. had been a civil, not criminal, violation.)¶ Initially, debate in the GOP-controlled Senate drifted. Majority Leader Bill Frist, considering a 2008 presidential bid, pushed his own enforcement-only bill. But amid the backdrop of huge public rallies against Sensenbrenner’s proposal, Sen. Arlen Specter unexpectedly joined with three other Republicans and all eight Judiciary Committee Democrats in late March to approve a comprehensive plan, including a path to citizenship, that followed a blueprint negotiated by Sens. Edward Kennedy and John McCain.¶ When broader Senate agreement teetered over the terms of legalization, Republican Sens. Chuck Hagel and Mel Martinez devised a compromise that divided illegal immigrants into three categories, requiring those here less than two years to leave but allowing those with deeper roots to eventually earn citizenship by paying fines and learning English. After Bush finally delivered a national address on immigration, a bill embodying that plan cleared the Senate with 62 votes, including support from 23 Republicans.¶ House Republicans immediately signaled their disinterest by refusing to appoint a conference committee and instead scheduled hearings in border communities to highlight security lapses. “Border security reigned supreme,” recalls Ron Bonjean, the communications director for then-Speaker Dennis Hastert. “I remember being in a meeting with … the leadership where pollsters came in and said border security was the key to our reelection.”¶ Even in 2006, something like the Senate plan likely could have attracted 218 votes in the House—but not a majority of Republicans. Faced with a collision between his two political imperatives—courting Hispanics and mobilizing conservatives—Bush blinked, allowing House leaders to replace the Senate bill with enforcement-only legislation, which he signed that fall. These choices began the GOP’s slide among Hispanics that continues unabated: Hispanic support for Republican House candidates plummeted from 44 percent in 2004 to just 29 percent in 2006, presaging Mitt Romney’s disastrous 27 percent showing among those voters in 2012.¶ That slippage is one of the two most important differences in the political environment around immigration between 2006 and today. Back then, as Bonjean notes, hardly any House Republicans argued that the GOP needed to pass a plan attractive to minorities. But many GOP leaders now see that as self-preservation. “The political imperative has shifted the tectonic plates,” says Frank Sharry, a key player in the 2006 debate who remains central as executive director of America’s Voice, which backs full citizenship for immigrants. “Immigration was viewed as a wedge issue for Republicans in 2006. Now it’s viewed as a wedge issue for Democrats.”¶ The “Gang of Eight” proposal released this week makes it likely that, as in 2006, the Senate will eventually pass a bipartisan immigration bill. Once again, there are probably 218 House votes for such a plan, but not a majority of the majority Republicans. That raises another key difference from 2006: Hastert faced little pressure to consider the Senate bill, because Bush bit his tongue when the speaker buried it. If House Republicans shelve another bipartisan Senate plan in 2013, they should expect much more public heat, because Obama won’t be as deferential.

### at: others push

#### Obama’s key

Fabian 1-25 [Jordan, Political Editor, ABC News, White House, Senators to Begin Push on Immigration Reform , 2013 -- http://abcnews.go.com/ABC\_Univision/News/white-house-senators-begin-push-immigration-reform/story?id=18315277]

"The president is the quarterback and he will direct the team, call¶ the play, and be pivotal if we succeed. I am very optimistic based on¶ conversations with Republicans in the House and Senate that we will do¶ more than just talk about the immigration issue this year," Gutierrez¶ said in a statement following the CHC meeting with Obama. "The¶ president putting his full weight and attention behind getting a bill¶ signed into law is tremendously helpful. We need the president and the¶ American people all putting pressure on the Congress to act because¶ nothing happens in the Capitol without people pushing from the¶ outside."

### at: thumpers – general

#### Obama has priced in the rest of his agenda and will get immigration done – a new contentious topic ruins his strategy

Zeleny 1-24 [Jeff, NYT political correspondent, “For Obama, am ambitious agenda faces ticking clock” IHT -- lexis]

The State of the Union address that Mr. Obama will deliver to Congress on Feb. 12 will offer the most definitive road map yet for how the White House will set priorities in his second term as well as how it intends to **avoid becoming mired in a heated debate over one contentious topic** to the detriment of the full agenda. ''There's no doubt you want to get off to a strong start, and we've got a pretty big dance card,'' said David Plouffe, a senior adviser to Mr. Obama who is leaving the White House this week. He ticked through a list of agenda items that included guns, immigration and fiscal issues, but he disputed the suggestion that one item would overtake the others. **''We clearly have this moment where we can get immigration done**,'' Mr. **Plouffe added**. ''If we don't get it done, then shame on us. We've got to seize this opportunity.''

### at: thumper – guns

**Not spending pc on it**

**Cain 2-5** [Michael, staff writer, "Gun Control Legislation is Another Victim of Our Short Attention Span" Policy Mic -- www.policymic.com/articles/24939/why-we-won-t-ever-see-a-real-gun-ban-in-america]

The president knows these things, and he isn’t about to spend valuable political capital trying to rise against the tide. **Within 60 days, nobody in Washington will be talking about gun control**. They will have moved on to more pressing matters, confident they have presented a brave attempt which will placate their constituents until the next time.

**Public push for gun control irrelevant – Obama still pushing immigration reform**

**Parsons 2-3** [Christi, White House correspondent for the Chicago Tribune, "Obama to keep up the pressure for immigration reform" LA Times -- articles.latimes.com/2013/feb/03/nation/la-na-pn-obama-immigration-napolitano-20130203]

President Obama’s public focus will be on gun violence this week, but behind the scenes he and key administration officials plan to keep pushing for immigration reform.

### at: thumper – budget

**All signals point towards the GOP backing down – their won’t be a fight – extension is inevitable – their ev is just hype**

**Kaletsky 1-23** [Anatole, journalist, financial economist, “Cooperation isn’t coming to Washington – it’s already arrived,” Reuters -- http://blogs.reuters.com/anatole-kaletsky/2013/01/23/cooperation-isnt-coming-to-washington-its-already-arrived/]

The House of Representatives decision to suspend the U.S. Treasury debt limit is the most important political event in America since President Barack Obama was first elected in 2008. As anticipated in this column immediately after the 2012 election, Washington seems to have broken its addiction to deadly games of economic chicken. That, in turn, should mean an orderly resolution of all U.S. fiscal problems and perhaps even an outbreak of bipartisan political cooperation, at least on economic issues, of a kind not seen in Washington since the early 1990s.¶ None of these favorable outcomes is yet acknowledged as true in Washington or Wall Street. Political analysts and market pundits have almost unanimously described the House decision as a diversionary tactic, simply designed to shift the high-noon confrontation with Obama to a new battleground more favorable to the Republican side: the March 1 date for automatic spending cuts under the sequestration procedure, or the March 27 expiration date of current government budgets.¶ This cynicism will almost certainly be proved wrong. The obvious reason is that **an army in full retreat,** as the Republicans have been since the election and fiscal cliff fiasco, finds it hard to regroup against an enemy enjoying strong momentum. And when such a battered force does attempt a last stand, this usually results in a rout. In this case, however, there are more specific reasons for the Republicans to seek peaceful coexistence instead of the fight-to-the-death over borrowing and spending that many pundits still predict. To see why House leaders decided to unilaterally disarm their nuclear weapons — first the fiscal cliff and now the debt ceiling — one has to understand the transformation in U.S. political dynamics that occurred the moment the votes were counted on Nov. 6.¶ Before the election, Republicans and their business backers had two overriding reasons to obstruct any deals with Obama on borrowing, spending or taxes. First, most Republicans genuinely expected to win the presidential election and therefore had every incentive to defer important decisions until their man was in power. Secondly, they calculated that any collateral damage inflicted on the economy through fiscal warfare would harm the incumbent president, whose Achilles’ heel was economic policy. Once the election was over, this calculus completely changed.¶ Having failed to unseat Obama, Republicans were suddenly in a situation where sabotaging the economy was no longer in their interests. As I argued immediately after the election, and again during the fiscal cliff negotiations, the GOP had few incentives after Nov. 7 to just thwart Obama. Republicans now had to persuade voters that their policies would promote jobs and growth — and would do so immediately, not in some distant future when budgets would have to balance or else the United States would turn into Greece.¶ The election also changed motivations for the Republicans’ business supporters. Instead of viewing Washington gridlock as a weapon for defeating Obama, American businesses after the election **had to accept the inevitable**. They would have to live with Obama and his policies, however much they disliked them. For most U.S. businesses, the primary political consideration was no longer the ideological debate over taxing and spending, but a purely economic issue: How would the economic policies negotiated between the White House and Congress affect business conditions in the four years leading to 2016?¶ This gestalt shift implies that **Republicans are unlikely to press very hard for large-scale spending cuts, government layoffs or fiscal tightening that could be seen as harming economic** recovery. Instead the focus should move to long-term budget reforms, designed to take effect only after the economy has largely recovered in 2015 or so – conveniently beyond the next congressional elections.¶ The president will have **strong incentives** to cooperate with such gradual fiscal consolidation, with major budget cuts backloaded to the last years of his administration and beyond. He would rather go down in history as the man who delivered universal healthcare, saved the U.S. economy from its worst crisis since the Great Depression, and put U.S. fiscal policy on a sustainable footing than waste his entire second term haggling over budgets – especially since achieving fiscal austerity does not require any major cuts or austerity, except in the very long term. ¶ In fact, the White House has already said it will offer some long-term entitlement reforms as part of the bipartisan budget deal that now looks eminently attainable. This may infuriate left-wing Democrats, but Obama is unlikely to care much, now that he has been reelected. In any case, grassroots Democratic voters will probably care more about presidential efforts on gun control, immigration and climate change than about wonkish arguments over Chained CPI and Medicare spending caps in the next decade.¶ Why then has there been little discussion of this change in political dynamics? Probably because **the media mostly see it as their role to magnify political drama rather than to analyze how they are likely to be resolved. The same applies to many professional politicians. Extreme statements from both parties will always attract the most media attention**. The congressional arithmetic, however, means that the views of radicals, highlighted by the media, are no longer very important.

# 2nr

**Not true for energy policy**

**Eisler 12** [Matthew N., Research Fellow at the Center for Contemporary History and Policy at the Chemical Heritage Foundation, “Science, Silver Buckshot, and ‘All of The Above’” Science Progress, April 2, http://scienceprogress.org/2012/04/science-silver-buckshot-and-%E2%80%9Call-of-the-above%E2%80%9D/]

Conservatives take President Obama’s rhetoric at face value. Progressives see the president as disingenuous. No doubt White House planners regard delaying the trans-border section of the Keystone XL pipeline and approving the Gulf of Mexico portion as a stroke of savvy realpolitik, but one has to wonder whether Democratic-leaning voters really are as gullible as this scheme implies. And as for the president’s claims that gasoline prices are determined by forces beyond the government’s control (speculation and unrest in the Middle East), it is probably not beyond the capacity of even the mildly educated to understand that the administration has shown little appetite to reregulate Wall Street and has done its part to inflate the fear premium through confrontational policies in the Persian Gulf. Committed both to alternative energy (but not in a rational, comprehensive way) and cheap fossil fuels (but not in ways benefiting American motorists in an election year), President Obama has accrued no political capital from his energy policy from either the left or the right by the end of his first term.¶ The president long ago lost the legislative capacity for bold action in practically every field, including energy, but because the GOP’s slate of presidential candidates is so extraordinarily weak in 2012, he may not need it to get re-elected. At least, that is the conventional wisdom in Democratic circles. Should President Obama win a second term, Congress is likely to be even more hostile than in his first term, as in the Clinton years. And as in the Clinton years, that will probably mean four more years of inaction and increased resort to cant.

#### Wins only build long-term capital

Purdum 10. [Todd, Columnist for Vanity Fair, “Obama Is Suffering Because of His Achievements, Not Despite Them,” 12-20 www.vanityfair.com/online/daily/2010/12/obama-is-suffering-because-of-his-achievements-not-despite-them.html]

With this weekend’s decisive Senate repeal of the military’s “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy for gay service members, can anyone seriously doubt Barack Obama’s patient willingness to play the long game? Or his remarkable success in doing so? In less than two years in office—often against the odds and the smart money’s predictions at any given moment—Obama has managed to achieve a landmark overhaul of the nation’s health insurance system; the most sweeping change in the financial regulatory system since the Great Depression; the stabilization of the domestic auto industry; and the repeal of a once well-intended policy that even the military itself had come to see as unnecessary and unfair. So why isn’t his political standing higher? Precisely because of the raft of legislative victories he’s achieved. Obama has pushed through large and complicated new government initiatives at a time of record-low public trust in government (and in institutions of any sort, for that matter), and he has suffered not because he hasn’t “done” anything but because he’s done so much—way, way too much in the eyes of his most conservative critics. With each victory, Obama’s opponents grow more frustrated, filling the airwaves and what passes for political discourse with fulminations about some supposed sin or another. Is it any wonder the guy is bleeding a bit? For his part, Obama resists the pugilistic impulse. To him, the merit of all these programs has been self-evident, and he has been the first to acknowledge that he has not always done all he could to explain them, sensibly and simply, to the American public. But Obama is nowhere near so politically maladroit as his frustrated liberal supporters—or implacable right-wing opponents—like to claim. He proved as much, if nothing else, with his embrace of the one policy choice he surely loathed: his agreement to extend the Bush-era income tax cuts for wealthy people who don’t need and don’t deserve them. That broke one of the president’s signature campaign promises and enraged the Democratic base and many members of his own party in Congress. But it was a cool-eyed reflection of political reality: The midterm election results guaranteed that negotiations would only get tougher next month, and a delay in resolving the issue would have forced tax increases for virtually everyone on January 1—creating nothing but uncertainty for taxpayers and accountants alike. Obama saw no point in trying to score political debating points in an argument he knew he had no chance of winning. Moreover, as The Washington Post’s conservative columnist Charles Krauthammer bitterly noted, Obama’s agreement to the tax deal amounted to a second economic stimulus measure—one that he could never otherwise have persuaded Congressional Republicans to support. Krauthammer denounced it as the “swindle of the year,” and suggested that only Democrats could possibly be self-defeating enough to reject it. In the end, of course, they did not. Obama knows better than most people that politics is the art of the possible (it’s no accident that he became the first black president after less than a single term in the Senate), and an endless cycle of two steps forward, one step back. So he just keeps putting one foot in front of the other, confident that he can get where he wants to go, eventually. The short-term results are often messy and confusing. Just months ago, gay rights advocates were distraught because Obama wasn’t pressing harder to repeal “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell.” Now he is apparently paying a price for his victory because some Republican Senators who’d promised to support ratification of the START arms-reduction treaty—identified by Obama as a signal priority for this lame-duck session of Congress—are balking because Obama pressed ahead with repealing DADT against their wishes. There is a price for everything in politics, and Obama knows that, too.

**White paper leak irrelevant – no one is confronting Obama on drones**

**NBC News 2-6** firstread.nbcnews.com/\_news/2013/02/06/16868588-obama-agenda-president-huddles-with-senate-democrats?lite

Josh Gerstein: “The leak of a secret Justice Department memo on using drones to kill U.S. citizens threw kerosene onto a simmering legal debate — but with most lawmakers showing **no appetite** to confront President Barack Obama publicly over the strikes, **the politics of the issue remain frozen**. Still, there’s little doubt the ‘white paper’ made its way to NBC News in an effort to draw more attention to drone questions just as Obama counterterrorism adviser John Brennan heads to his CIA director confirmation hearing Thursday.”

**No big deal**

**Gerstein 2-6** [Josh, White House reporter, "Obama faces new questions on drones" Politico -- dyn.politico.com/printstory.cfm?uuid=D48FFD50-EBAC-45B6-809A-248C039D902C]

**Don’t confuse a legal fight with a political one**¶ Many Democrats who were up in arms about President George W. Bush’s war on terror have been **conspicuously silent** about Obama’s use of drones. Save for a handful of libertarians, tough-on-terror Republican lawmakers have either endorsed the president’s policy or called for Obama to be even more aggressive.¶ “There’s been no robust oversight of this,” Osburn said. The only known public hearing devoted to the issue was a 2010 session of the House Oversight Committee.¶ However, Senate Intelligence Committee Chairman Dianne Feinstein (D-Calif.) said in a statement Tuesday that, behind the scenes, her panel has been conducting “appropriate and probing oversight into the use of legal force. She acknowledged, though, that despite the panel’s efforts, its members have yet to see the classified memos from which the white paper was derived.¶ “The committee continues to seek the actual legal opinions,” she said.¶ In some measure of current concern in Congress about the issue, a total of 11 senators signed a letter to Obama on Monday asking him to fork over the original classified opinions. Eight Democrats signed on, including Wyden and Judiciary Committee Chairman Patrick Leahy of Vermont — but not Feinstein. Only three Republicans joined: Mike Lee of Utah, Chuck Grassley of Iowa and Susan Collins of Maine.¶ In a Washington Post poll taken last February, 65 percent of Americans approved of Obama’s use of drones against U.S. citizen terror suspects, while 26 percent disapproved. And despite some noise from the left on the issue, support for drone operations was nearly as great among Democrats as the public at large.

**PTC extension was TEMPORARY which is why it got support and avoided debate – it was DROWNED OUT by fiscal cliff – this slays their link turns**

**Juliano 12/22** (Wind tax credit debate simmers amid ongoing ‘fiscal cliff’ talks, MIDWEST ENERGY NEWS, http://www.midwestenergynews.com/2012/12/20/wind-tax-credit-debate-simmers-amid-ongoing-fiscal-cliff-talks/)

The ongoing war of words over the “fiscal cliff” that intensified this week left unanswered one of the most important questions for energy watchers: What will happen to a suite of expired or expiring tax credits? The debate over those incentives, including the wind production tax credit and subsidies to promote energy efficiency and alternative fuels, has largely simmered on the back burner amid the broader debate over across-the-board tax hikes and spending cuts scheduled to take effect in January. That is still the case, although observers continue to believe they have a good chance of being included in a year-end cliff package, if there is one. House Speaker John Boehner (R-Ohio) on Tuesday unveiled a “Plan B” approach to avoid most of the looming tax hikes, but it did not address the PTC or other so-called tax extenders. President Obama and Senate Democrats were quick to dismiss the offer. Rep. Pat Tiberi (R-Ohio), who has been a leading negotiator over the fate of the PTC, acknowledged that it and other temporary tax provisions “take a back seat” to the broader debate over the cliff and that it would take “a deal on everything else” to see movement on extending the temporary credits. Boehner’s proposal was seen as largely a messaging exercise, with the extenders still expected to be along for the ride if Congress and the White House can reach a broader deal on taxes and spending, lawmakers and lobbyists said. “I suspect this is all for show,” one wind lobbyist said of Boehner’s proposal. ‘A lot of quiet conversations’ Sen. Mark Udall (D-Colo.), who has been leading a public push for a PTC extension with near-daily floor speeches, said yesterday that there have been “a lot of quiet conversations” among senators over how to insert the credit into a broader fiscal cliff deal but that he was not at liberty to say more. Udall participated Wednesday in an online discussion with Energy Secretary Steven Chu over the future of the wind industry and the importance of policies such as the PTC. The House is expected to vote soon on the Boehner Plan B proposal. It would continue George W. Bush-era tax cuts for people earning less than $1 million per year but not address temporary tax breaks like the PTC or across-the-board spending cuts known as the sequester. Rep. Kristi Noem (R-S.D.), a leading PTC advocate, said Tuesday morning that the fate of the wind credit had not yet been discussed with the full House Republican conference but that she remained optimistic it could win an extension as part of a larger fiscal cliff deal ([Greenwire](http://www.eenews.net/Greenwire/2012/12/18/archive/2), Dec. 18). The PTC and other energy incentives are included in a broader mix of tax provisions known as “extenders” **because they are temporary** and often have to be renewed. The Senate Finance Committee this summer voted to extend and modify the PTC as part of a larger package to extend dozens of temporary tax breaks, including big-ticket items such as relief from the alternative minimum tax (AMT) and the popular research and development credit. That bill never came to the floor, but lawmakers remain optimistic it will see action before the end of the year as part of a larger package. “I expect that when it comes to extenders if we have a fiscal cliff bill that all of the extenders will be in there, probably driven by AMT or research and development,” Sen. Chuck Grassley (R-Iowa), a leading PTC champion, told reporters Tuesday. Boehner’s Plan B, which is not expected to pass the Senate, did include a permanent AMT fix, although other extenders were not included. Tiberi predicted Congress would eventually address the so-called tax extenders, and he suggested that separating the AMT fix would not affect the chances for other extenders to be renewed. “I think there’s a lot of members who are supportive of a lot of the different extenders,” Tiberi told reporters last night. “So whether it’s done next week if there’s a deal or next month if there’s a deal, I still think in the interim — before comprehensive tax reform, which is a goal for a lot of us — that you have that debate still.” Sen. Orrin Hatch (R-Utah), the ranking member on Finance, said, “You can’t help but have those [as] part of a final debate” over the fiscal cliff.

**Spending PC**

**Benen 2/6** [Steve, political writer, "Defining the 'extremes' in the immigration debate" MSNBC -- maddowblog.msnbc.com/\_news/2013/02/06/16868677-defining-the-extremes-in-the-immigration-debate]

At the surface, there's ample reason for optimism on comprehensive immigration reform. President Obama is investing considerable political capital into the issue; the public strongly supports the reform efforts; a bipartisan bill is already progressing in the Senate; and every Republican strategist and consultant is warning the party not to further alienate the fastest-growing voting constituency in the country.

**Predictive ev**

**Rusling 2/6** [Matthew, Special Correspondent at Xinhua, "Chances for US immigration reform good, but pitfalls remain" Philippines News Agency -- lexis]

The chances of passing U.S. immigration reform are high, but the devil is in the details, and those finer points could be a stumbling block for cooperation in a bitterly divided Congress. ¶ The long-simmering debate over fixing the nation's broken immigration system kicked off Tuesday with a House hearing after President Barack Obama vowed last week to take action in his second term.¶ While former President George W. Bush tried his hand at reform with a bill that ultimately failed, experts said **conditions this time are ripe for Congress to hammer out a deal.**¶ "For the first time in many years, members of both parties have political incentives to reform our broken immigration system," said Darrell M. West, director of governance studies at the Brookings Institution.¶ "With the poor showing of Republicans in the 2012 elections, they need to address the immigration issues that are at the top of the political agenda for most Latino voters," he said, referring to the Republican Party's loss of more than 70 percent of the Latino vote and that party's need, by its own admission, to cast off the image of a party of old, white males.¶ Citing polls showing 70 percent of Americans want immigration reform, Democratic Strategist Joe Trippi expressed hope Monday during a Fox News panel that Congress could come to an agreement.